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Executive Summary 
With the launch of the Constellation program, NASA finds itself with the opportunity to design 
the next generation of manned vehicles that will take man to the Moon and beyond in the next 
two decades. While there are precedents for many aspects of the design, development, test, and 
evaluation (DDT&E) task at hand – the Apollo program, Space Transportation System, 
International Space Station (ISS) and others – the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Astronaut Office 
asked for a fresh look at first principles during the formative times of this new program.  
As a result, a team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected 
methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to 
identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety1 and reliability. The team also 
identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe 
and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from 
experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in 
contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations 
and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace 
existing standards and policy.
Summary of Fundamental Top Level Conclusions 
A. History indicates no subsystem, component, or system element is immune from failure. 
While systems and their component parts have become more mature and reliable over the last 
four decades, the increase in system capability brings with it complexity and uncertainty in 
performance that can threaten any system element. The most frequent failure causes are in 
design, understanding of the environment, parts, and workmanship. The potentially generic, 
cross cutting, nature of these causes threatens the system, its redundancy, and other hazard 
controls.
B. There is no single requirement, method, or process, which, by itself, assures the “right stuff” 
for safety and reliability. The realities of the complex and uncertain nature of space flight 
manifested throughout the life cycle require a multifaceted approach to controlling risk.  
C. System level safety and reliability is achieved by maintaining a focus on these throughout the 
DDT&E life cycle and during spacecraft operations. Safety and mission success assessments 
should be performed by the design team periodically throughout the life cycle as the design 
matures into hardware, software and a flight system. Assessments start from a top down 
functional perspective at the beginning of the life cycle and then mature along with the 
system design to include component design details. By focusing the design team on safety, 
and adherence to basic principles, the development team will seek to predict how the system 
will perform, discover safety and mission success risks, and obviate or mitigate their 
consequences before the system becomes operational.  The designers of the system are 
1  “Safety” as used in this report (Section 1.0.1) restricts the definition to personnel loss or injury, in contrast to the 
broader definition used in Mil-Std 882 which includes loss of mission and loss of hardware. 
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ultimately responsible for the safety of the design, and the analysis to demonstrate that 
safety; safety, reliability, and quality assurance organizations and personnel are there to 
facilitate this process and provide independent oversight.
Guiding principles: 
1. Define a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs, objectives and constraints, 
including safety, that form the validation basis for subsequent work.
2. Manage and lead the program with a safety focus, simple and easy to understand 
management structures, and clear lines of authority and responsibility among the 
elements.  
3. Specify safety and reliability requirements through a triad of fault tolerance, bounding 
failure probability, and adhering to proven practices and standards.
4. Manage complexity by keeping the primary (mission) objectives as simple and minimal 
as possible and adding complexity to the system only where necessary to achieve these 
objectives.
5. Conceive the right system conceptual design early in the life cycle by thoroughly 
exploring risks from the top down and using a risk-based design loop to iterate the 
operations concept, the design, and the requirements until the system meets mission 
objectives at minimum complexity and is achievable within constraints. 
6. Build the system right by applying a multilayered, “defense in depth”2 approach of 
following proven design and manufacturing practices, holding independent reviews, 
inspecting the end product, and employing a “test like you fly, fly like you test” 
philosophy.
7. Seek and collect warning signs and precursors to safety, mission success and 
development risks throughout the life cycle, and integrate those into a total risk picture 
with appropriate mitigation activities.  
These principles are supported by a foundation of established project management, systems 
engineering, safety and mission assurance, and operations practices that encourages a safety 
focus throughout the program life cycle. The safety focus includes the attitude and approach to 
safety of those conceiving, producing and operating the integrated system in addition to 
individual components and system elements.  
2  Dunn, M, Remaking NASA one step at a time, Associated Press, October 12, 2003, (“The opinions of technicians 
and engineers, no matter how low on the ladder, were not only respected, but sought by flight directors like the 
legendary Kranz. He practiced "defense in depth," so that if a technical problem slipped past one group, it would be 
caught by the next, or the next. He demanded toughness, competence, confidence.”) 
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Safety Focus
When considering the safety of a design, it is critical to maintain a top-down view of the system 
as a whole and answer questions like: “What can go wrong to affect safety?”, “What are the 
consequences?”, and “How likely is it?”  These questions have equal bearing as performance and 
cost, especially when considering critical systems and functions. Assuring the correct questions 
are asked requires experience, understanding of the mission objectives and a sense of curiosity, 
skepticism, and imagination for what could go wrong.  
Next, the team must answer these questions and identify steps to make the total system safe and 
reliable so ultimately the project can affirmatively state, “The system is safe to fly because ___ 
was done.” By the same token, weak links must be addressed as, “It will be safe if and when ___ 
is done.” 
The safety focus seeks to obviate or mitigate risks before they surface as problems in flight. This 
is achieved by developing an understanding of how the integrated system is expected to perform 
and how it might fail through a thorough examination of its design and its use. 
Distinguishing between Safety and Mission Success 
This report distinguishes between safety and mission success to provide a consequence-based 
focus that is useful during design, production, operations, and overall risk management. 
Distinguishing between safety and mission success is important when deciding when the mission 
should be aborted to preserve crew safety and when efforts to preserve mission success may 
adversely impact safety. 
A safe system ensures the survival, health, and well-being of the crew during nominal and off-
nominal operational scenarios.  It also provides strategies to avoid or deal with unsafe conditions 
and applies margin to the system to prevent the exceedance of limits that may result in harm to 
the crew. 
A reliable system assures mission success by functioning properly over its intended life. It has a 
low and acceptable probability of failure, achieved through simplicity, proper design, and proper 
application of reliable parts and materials.  In addition to long life, a reliable system is robust and 
fault tolerant, meaning it can tolerate failures and variations in its operating parameters and 
environments. 
Safety and reliability objectives often work together, but can also compete. The two work 
together when margins are added to the system to ensure its continued operation from both safety 
and mission success perspectives. They compete when safety objectives seek to prevent a 
hazardous condition that also interrupts mission success.  For example, a human rated system 
would set safety limits, such as engine red lines, prior to the point of failure to allow a crew abort 
scenario. An early or false abort may occur at the expense of mission success. 
The team producing this report highlighted seven guiding principles for DDT&E based upon 
nearly five decades of space travel that drive safety and reliability. A discussion of each item is 
presented below and further developed later in the report: 
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1. Defining Program Needs, Objectives, and Constraints (Section 2.1)
Define a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs, objectives, and constraints, including 
safety, that form the validation basis for subsequent work.
Primary requirements of the spacecraft and its related systems are derived from the mission 
objectives. The more simply and easily the mission objectives are to define, the easier the job of 
validating the requirements and system. A senior program manager in the Apollo days, 
interviewed after the successful conclusion of the program, said, “The mission was easy to 
define:  Man, the Moon, this Decade.”  Thanks to the clarity of that overarching goal, he was 
always able to test the need for any proposed new requirements by asking, “Does this help get a 
man on the Moon in this decade and return him to safely home?”  If the answer was no then the 
design would continue without it.
However, if the mission objective is expansive and ill-defined, there is room for all manner of 
add-ons that could eventually produce a system that either cannot be built or, if built, cannot be 
operated with a high degree of confidence. Consider the guidance during the initial days of the 
Space Transportation System (STS) development which called for a versatile system capable of 
being adapted to perform all plausible, but undefined, future missions. With such open-ended 
guidance, practically any new requirement can be defended, leading the design to grow in 
complexity. 
Most programs have mission objectives that are somewhere between the two extremes, often 
with room for a variety of interpretations. As a result, the programs can become subject to 
mission creep that can lead to schedule slips and increased weight, cost, and complexity, the 
antithesis of reliability. 
2. Organizing and Managing the Program (Section 2.1)
Manage and lead the program with a safety focus, simple and easy to understand management 
structures, and clear lines of authority and responsibility among the elements.
Having established an appropriate objective, the next most important step is to create an 
organizational structure that can carry out the program. The organization should be staffed with 
experienced people who understand the needs and objectives, can conceive and produce a system 
that meets those needs, and have the curiosity, skepticism, and imagination to identify what can 
go wrong, and can then take appropriate action. This must go beyond asking the question, “Am I 
meeting requirements?” 
The most effective means of producing successful systems is to put properly prepared and 
professionally competent managers in charge, provide them with adequate resources, challenge 
them with a difficult but doable schedule, and give them sufficient authority to be held 
personally responsible for results.  Experience shows that competent people who accept personal 
responsibility for the final outcome will do more to find the right balance among the plethora of 
competing demands that must be addressed during development.  
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Executive management has three critical responsibilities in making this process work.
x Selecting the right objectives, organizational structure, and key personnel is first.
x After selecting the right people, they must ensure that each manager’s authority and 
responsibility are unambiguous, co-aligned, and supported.
x Finally, having delegated authority and responsibility to a team that will be working under 
intense pressure for years, management must provide a safety net by maintaining discipline 
in execution of the Program Plan, ensuring transparency, and providing timely independent 
assessments of progress.  Such activities are not bureaucratic but enable the team to operate 
aggressively while knowing there will be a second set of eyes to help them avoid errors of 
commission and omission.  Through formal reviews and informal communications the 
executive leadership will gain insight into the state of the program and health of the team that 
is executing it.  In so doing, the probability of identifying and correcting the inevitable 
mistakes will increase, thereby protecting the team, mission, and agency. 
The organization should support and encourage a safety focus among team members including 
suppliers. The effectiveness of the safety focus depends on the following factors depicted as the 
poles in Figure i-5: 
x The team’s experience and their access to experienced personnel when needed, 
x Their understanding and acceptance of the mission objectives, 
x A sense of curiosity, skepticism, and imagination to identify what might go wrong. The team 
should ask, “Why is it safe?” throughout the program life cycle. Affirmative answers to these 
questions create a preponderance of evidence the system is safe to fly.  Concluding an 
affirmative in the absence of contrary evidence (“It has never failed before”) must be 
avoided.3  Long strings of successes can unintentionally lead to misunderstanding or 
underestimating risks inherent in the system, and 
x Free and open discussion of safety issues among all team members and suppliers is critical to 
assuring that all parts of the system receive consistent attention to safety. 
3 Kraft, C., Flight, My Life in Mission Control, (Dutton, 2001), p 98 (“If somebody says that something 
never happens, be prepared because it probably will”), (This book provides good insight into the degree 
that the early manned spaceflight era focused on expecting the unexpected and not taking success for 
granted. They focused on making the unknowns known and being prepared should one surface)
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3. Defining Safety and Reliability for Human Rated Systems (Sections 2.2 and 3.0)
Specify safety and reliability requirements through a triad of fault tolerance, bounding failure 
probability, and adhering to proven practices and standards.
A safe and reliable human rated spacecraft system provides a reasonable assurance that the crew 
survives nominal and off-nominal operational scenarios.  NASA-STD-3000 Man-Systems 
Integration Standards provides a set of requirements that assure crew survival in the space 
environment including a breathable atmosphere, safe thermal and g-loads, safe radiation 
environment, and adequate nourishment and personal health and hygiene opportunities. 
Assurance of crew survival during off-nominal and failure scenarios leads to requirements that 
seek to prevent faults and assure crew safety in spite of faults. To maximize safety and 
reliability, design the system with a fault tolerant architecture supported by probabilistic safety, 
reliability, and risk analyses backed up by data, hard evidence and/or analysis whenever possible. 
The system should then be manufactured and operated according to proven practices. Taken 
together, these three elements (fault tolerance, bounding probability of failure, and adhering to 
proven practices) as shown in Figure i-1, form a triad that defines the overall safety and 
reliability requirements.  
Assessing safety and reliability starts at the onset of the program with high level functions and 
continues throughout the life cycle as the design matures and system elements are produced, 
integrated, and prepared for flight. 
Figure i-1 Three Pronged Safety and Reliability Requirement 
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x Assess fault tolerance at the program level from a top down functional perspective and 
flow it to lower levels only after it is optimized from the total system perspective. For 
example, levying a two fault tolerance requirement at lower levels may introduce system 
complexities that may be inappropriate since mitigation can occur at higher levels where 
the systems interact. 
x The objective of bounding the probability of failure is to encourage a thorough 
investigation into risks including uncertainty and common cause such that the system 
design decisions and underlying risk analysis can be defended. Estimating the likelihood 
of failure challenges the design team to achieve a deeper understanding of the system and 
its environment and provides a way to make trades when protecting against worst case 
assumptions that cause a design to become overly complex or over weight.  The value of 
a probability estimate is not so much contained in the absolute number but in the 
thorough investigation, debate, and discussions by designers and operators about 
controlling the potential for failures based on their likelihood, history of similar systems, 
and uncertainties inherent in the system design. The analysis of the system design must 
consider the integrated whole and include a top down assessment. The analyses are most 
useful for evaluating and comparing design and operations alternatives and validating the 
chosen system design. To ensure valid comparison correct statistical methods should be 
used to determine probability of failure and include all available data sources. 
x Identify and follow proven practices and processes for design, manufacturing, 
independent review, inspection, test, and operations. Processes can achieve consistency 
and provide a method for following through on details necessary for safety and reliability. 
Disciplined adherence to critical processes is important for achieving the safety and 
reliability the designers intended. 
4. Managing Complexity (Section 2.0)
Manage complexity by keeping the primary (mission) objectives as simple and minimal as 
possible and adding complexity to the system only where necessary to achieve these objectives. 
System complexity must be minimized since it is the most significant feature of systems that fail. 
Complexity impedes the designer’s understanding of how various system elements might interact 
and could prevent a full understanding of the integrated system. Human spaceflight operates on 
the boundaries of technological capabilities. It is a highly integrated activity that is complex and 
requires the sequential success of a large number of active subsystems all of which are operating 
close to their limits. As such, a small increase in complexity may have a negative impact on 
safety and reliability. Consider the following graphs in Figure i-2 that show complexity as a 
function of cost and development time for a wide range of spacecraft, some successful, some not. 
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Spacecraft Cost as Function of Complexity
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Figure i-2 Complexity versus Development Time and Cost 
One way to interpret the graphs is that a complex mission must be provided an adequate budget 
and sufficient time to be successful.  Another interpretation suggests that if a mission is 
sufficiently complex, it will probably fail. Regardless of the interpretation, complexity is the 
antithesis of reliability and should be limited to what is needed to accomplish the mission 
objective.
Managing and integrating pieces into a cohesive whole.  A common method for managing 
large and complex systems is to divide the whole into smaller, simpler "manageable" pieces, and 
then allow separate groups to individually produce those pieces. The splitting of the system into 
pieces must occur from the top down considering the critical functions necessary for safety and 
reliability. Engineering managers must have a firm grasp of the risk drivers for their system even 
if they are at very low levels of the Work Breakdown System (WBS).   
The engineering and management challenge then becomes the process of reintegrating the pieces 
into a cohesive system while avoiding adverse couplings and interactions that may affect safety 
and reliability.
Simplifying design, modeling, and interfacing assumptions early in the life cycle often turn out 
to be more complex when actual systems are produced and tested. The role of the systems 
engineer in integration requires the mindset of a "generalist" who can identify critical functional, 
physical interfaces, and interactions among tightly coupled system elements. Functional and 
physical interfaces must be kept simple so he can identify where newly joined elements of the 
system may adversely interact and compromise safety and reliability. 
Design teams responsible for individual system elements must be aware of their system’s 
sensitivities and unwanted interactions with other system elements to understand potential 
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adverse coupling with other systems. It is important for the Systems Engineering Team to 
recognize the importance of interaction among discipline engineers after requirements have been 
allocated and to capture cross-interface information in Interface Control Documents (ICD).   
Understand the external and induced environments.  Design teams must also understand the 
sensitivities of their system to nominal and off-nominal excursions in the external environment 
along with their associated probabilities of occurrence. The more complex the system the more 
difficult it is to understand the system sensitivities to the environment. 
Controlling implications of new technology The mix of new and existing technologies in a 
design can add to complexity that affects safety and reliability. New technology can improve 
safety and reliability when carefully selected and applied, though new technologies often bring 
with them “unknown unknowns” that may represent safety and reliability risks.  
In cases where new technologies are necessary, the systems engineer must help the design teams 
assess the maturity and identify potential interactions along with additional constraints and 
uncertainty the new technology might introduce. Introducing new technologies may make the 
system more reliable at maturity, but failures during the maturation process may make the 
system less reliable when considered over the life of the program. The systems engineer must 
understand how new technology introduces unknowns into the program, and what can be done to 
combat them.  Examples include incorporating additional margin, extra testing, alternative flight 
manifests, and concepts of operations. 
Applying Heritage and COTS system elements. Using “Heritage” and Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) system elements are often utilized as a way to reduce risk. However, COTS 
elements can introduce complexity and risk if they are not applied properly. COTS products 
bring with them design constraints, predefined interfaces, and operational constraints that the 
receiving system must accommodate. COTS elements, especially those with a proven flight track 
record, can improve safety and reliability, but it is their proper application and accommodation in 
a new and different application that represents a challenge to the systems designer. For COTS 
and heritage components, the design focus shifts from having to define the component’s detailed 
requirements (as in newly developed items) to accommodating its constraints. 
Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the engineering team to ensure that the benefits are realized 
and that unknowns are discovered before flight. The promise and advertised benefit of a new 
technology or COTS elements is often not realized in practice and should therefore be addressed 
from a risk perspective.  
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5. Conceiving the Right System (Section 2.3, Sections 4.0 through 12.0)
Conceive the right system conceptual design early in the life cycle by thoroughly exploring risks 
from the top down and using a risk-based design loop to iterate the operations concept, design, 
and requirements until the system meets mission objectives at minimum complexity and is 
achievable within constraints. 
Defining the conceptual design early in the life cycle has a high degree of influence on the 
system’s safety and reliability. Fundamental safety characteristics designed into the system will 
either put the program on a smooth trajectory, or one that will require numerous design fixes and 
operational workarounds to respond to emerging safety issues and failures. The objective of the 
early work should be to guide a balanced design by choosing either inherent reliability, like 
and/or diverse redundancy, or maintenance approaches to achieve safety and reliability.4 Choices 
should be driven by mission objectives and constraints and justified by risk analysis. Choices 
then define the complexity of the system, how it can fail, how likely it could fail, what happens 
should it fail, and any coupling and cascading effects of the various system elements.  
Since the early work has a high degree of influence on safety and reliability, it is critical that 
lower level requirements not be written too early unintentionally precluding other viable and 
safer solutions allowed by an alternate set of requirements.   
In an ideal world, the design process is a series of iterative steps performed in a top down fashion 
along the life cycle guided by risk assessments that are sequenced so that uncertainty is 
progressively removed as design knowledge matures.  
Below is one path applicable to the upfront work in the life cycle that can lead to such a design:  
Step 1 Define needs, objectives, and constraints in clear and simple terms, and then capture 
them as the high level requirements. These form the validation basis for the subsequent 
work. The constraints can be visualized as the boundaries of a box as shown in Figure i-3. 
Subsequent steps seek to find solutions within box constraint boundaries and select one 
for development. Alternatives should be plotted against constraints forming a “surface” 
from which a solution is selected. 
4  A survey of existing proven designs and previously developed concepts can be useful at this point in the 
development, but constraining the process to only existing designs/concepts too early can lead to the “wrong 
design.” 
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Figure i-3 Project Constraints Box Showing Alternatives as a Surface with Selected 
Solution
Step 2 Define the minimum set of functions necessary to accomplish the mission objectives. 
x Identify and describe the functions the system must perform from a systematic top 
down perspective to fulfill mission needs and objectives. 
x Clearly identify and distinguish functions necessary for safety and mission success. 
This distinction is critical for assessing and accepting a function’s criticality, 
appropriate fault tolerance, and probability of failure. 
x The identified critical functions should be used to set up the Product Breakdown 
Structure (PBS) (the source for a product-structured WBS) in a manner that prevents 
unnecessary splitting of safety critical functions that would complicate interface 
control and team understanding of adverse couplings. 
x Defining the necessary functions allows a clear understanding or statement of the 
problem to help guide and define appropriate solutions. Often a solution becomes 
evident after a clear statement of the problem. 
Step 3 Make it work. Create the simplest conceptual design of the contemplated system.  
x Start with the simplest, most robust, and highest performance design option as the 
primary leg for accomplishing the mission functions identified above with inherent 
safety. The primary leg also forms the first leg when assessing fault tolerance. The 
simplest solution should lie within the constraint box boundaries with adequate 
margin for the succeeding steps below.  
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x If the simplest solution falls outside the constraint box, then there may not be a 
workable solution; start the process over again with an alternate set of needs, 
objectives, and constraints. 
x If the solution falls inside the constraint box but is not viewed as viable or optimum, 
consider alternatives with different operational concepts, designs, or derived 
requirements as depicted in the iterative loop shown in Figure i-4. 
Step 4 Make it safe. Add diverse or independent elements to the simple system of step 3 that 
operates at lower or even marginal performance but with higher reliability as necessary to 
meet safety needs. This additional leg adds to system fault tolerance, although it may be 
applied as the last leg not necessarily the second leg. A simple diverse system maximizes 
the independence from prime system faults and should be easier to understand and verify. 
x Evaluate the conceptual design and operations concept to determine potential failure 
modes and safety impacts.  Initially the evaluation must be performed from the top 
down starting from the mission level and consider each operational phase or 
operational system configuration of the mission. Utilize Functional Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) (based on functions) and/or Fault Tree Analysis (top down 
based on undesired consequences) along with an integrating technique such as Event 
Sequence Diagrams (ESD) to identify Risk Drivers.  
x Utilize risk and reliability modeling techniques to bound the likelihood of the 
identified safety drivers. Discussions and debates resulting from likelihood and 
consequence discussions are helpful for further understanding and exploring the risk 
drivers.
x Pay particular attention to common cause and common mode failures that may defeat 
the intended safety improvements of the additional elements. 
x Iterate the candidate mission rules and procedures to safely achieve the minimum 
acceptable objective.  
x Provide an abort mode for those phases of the mission where the likelihood or 
consequence of safety critical initiating events or consequences cannot be contained. 
x An effective methodology is to start with the “end game” of returning the crew to 
Earth and continue to work backwards from Earth reentry to mission initiation 
assuring that safety and reliability are preserved during each operational phase of the 
mission. In other words utilize technical resources such as, mass, volume, power, etc, 
to get the crew home first. 
x If the solution is not safe, consider alternatives with different operational concepts, 
designs, or derived requirements as depicted in the iterative loop shown in Figure i-4. 
Step 5 Make it reliable.  Consider additional elements or other “legs,” preferentially an 
additional primary leg of equivalent performance but not necessarily identical design for 
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mission success. Additional legs for mission continuance add to system fault tolerance.   
Determine if the addition of the mission success leg leads to a safer system by 
considering all the potential dependencies.
x Utilize risk and reliability modeling techniques to estimate the effects of one 
alternative over another. If an alternative reduces overall risk is affordable, add it; if 
not, be sure that the implications of accepting this risk are understood. Again, 
discussions and debates resulting from likelihood and consequence discussions are 
helpful for further understanding and exploring the risk drivers. 
x Pay particular attention to common cause failures that may defeat the intended safety 
and reliability improvements of additional elements. Strive for designs that will limit 
the occurrence or consequence of common cause failures.  
x Consider the maturity and complexity of the system when addressing how to mitigate 
“unknown unknowns.” This may drive additional features to facilitate testing and 
verification needs; for example, additional test points or data recorders. 
x If the solution is not reliable, consider alternatives with different operational 
concepts, designs, or derived requirements as depicted in the iterative loop shown in 
Figure i-4. 
Step 6 Make it Affordable.  Estimate cost and schedule to develop, produce, and operate the 
system design of steps 2 through 4.   
x Upfront design work has a high degree of leverage on the system’s cost since these 
early activities expend around 10 to 15 percent of the project cost yet commit in 
excess of 50 percent of the total run out costs. 
x Iterate the operations concept, the design, or the derived requirements as necessary to 
satisfy constraints, go back through steps 2, 3, 4, and/or 5 as necessary. 
Step 7 Capture the Conceptual Design  
x Capture the decisions and supporting rationale of steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 as the derived 
requirements, baseline operations concept, and baseline conceptual design.
x Consider all the legs of the system design when assessing system fault tolerance 
utilizing the rationale developed in the above steps to justify any differences between 
the selected approach and the starting point of two-fault tolerance. 
x Develop a program plan that tentatively defines prioritized requirements for each 
system element in the PBS, allocates physical and resource constraints to each, 
describes a system acquisition strategy, and assigns management responsibility for 
each effort.  At the completion of this step, a safe and reliable system, producible at 
minimum cost, schedule, and complexity has been identified. 
The previous steps describe a methodology for developing a design that can meet the needs and 
operational requirements through an iterative loop until performance, cost/schedule, and risk 
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constraints are met. Even though the process is described in a step-by-step fashion, aspects of 
performance, safety and reliability, and affordability are not independent quantities and should 
not be considered independently in the process of design.  While safety is of paramount 
importance, the implied order or hierarchy to the design process obligates the designer to make 
the design work first, make it safe and reliable, and then assure it is affordable.  This is because 
affordability is moot if the design will not achieve a reasonable level of safety and reliability, and 
safety and reliability are moot if the design does not function. 
Utilizing this type of integrated methodology described above and shown in Figure i-4 provides 
affirmative rationale for the system design, its complexity, and the existence of each system 
element. This approach may lessen the likelihood of having to lop off pieces of a design to get it 
back “in the box.” Lopping invariably leaves the system in a less cohesive state, vulnerable to 
unexpected interactions and other shortfalls. 
Figure i-4 Objectives Driven and Risk Based Iterative Design Loop 
x Needs and Objectives drive the identification of functions 
x Functions drive an iterative risk based loop that converges the operations concept, the 
design, and the requirements towards a viable solution 
x The viable solution meets users needs and objectives within program constraints 
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At any point along the design life cycle teams can ask; “Is this the correct solution, and why is it 
safe?” One effective technique is to start with the integrated system block diagram and determine 
if sufficient justification exists for the existence and configuration of every system element on 
the block diagram with rationale grounded in safety and mission success. If team members are 
not sure that the solution is the correct solution then retracing the steps described above can help 
with providing the desired justification and rationale for the design choices. 
6. Building the System Right (Section 2.4, Sections 4.0 through 12.0) 
Build the system right by applying a multilayered, defense in-depth approach of following proven 
design and manufacturing practices, holding independent reviews and inspecting, and employing 
a “test like you fly, fly like you test” approach to assure that the system is safe and reliable. 
Building a safe and reliable system requires the team to follow sound design and implementation 
processes with emphasis on safety and reliability during each life cycle phase. After the 
architecture is defined, the selected concept must be matured into hardware, software, logistics, 
etc., through the “Preliminary and Detailed Design,” “Manufacturing and Assembly,” “System 
Integration and Verification,” and “Operations” life cycle processes as shown in Figure i-7. 
Assuring safety and reliability in a complex system operating in uncertain environments argues 
for overlapping and diverse methods to not only develop the system properly but also to provide 
maximum coverage for identifying and screening potential problems. Deploying a multilayered 
approach as shown in Figure i-5 not only synergistically drives the system to function as 
intended and required, but also allows the discovery of potential catastrophic problems. Diverse 
layers depicted as multiple nets in Figure i-5 include: 
x Sound design and manufacturing processes based on proven practices defining the 
intent for producing a safe and reliable system. Performance predictions and analytical 
assumptions are validated by test verified models or test of engineering and/or 
qualification hardware. Well-controlled manufacturing process, including statistical 
controls where appropriate, maintains or enhances quality and reliability. 
x Independent reviews by experienced peers allow the team to benefit from the 
experience of others not involved in the program. Reviews should be set up to benefit the 
program team and should be viewed as a welcome input to system safety and reliability. 
Review teams should not only utilize their experience to critique but should also suggest 
potential solutions. 
x Inspections and walk downs by not only Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA), but 
also Engineering and the Crew to assure the system is produced as intended. 
x “Test Like You Fly” approach broad enough to include not only requirements 
verification but also validation of the system through performance, mission simulations, 
end to end tests, and joint integrated simulations including off-nominal scenarios that 
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assure the system can in fact accomplish the mission with the intended safety controls 
and mission success robustness.  The “Test Like You Fly” approach includes critical 
examination where such testing is not possible or accomplished in pieces to assure 
sufficient test coverage over the expected flight environments and operational sequences. 
Testing provides the last line of defense and opportunity to discover unexpected 
interactions and the ability to validate and verify models used during design. A difficult 
challenge of discovering unknowns lies in assuring that complex systems are testable and 
verifiable prior to flight.  These test approaches therefore need to be factored into a 
testable design. 
x “Fly Like You Test” operations approach to limit the chance of encountering an 
unexpected interaction among system elements and their environments not previously 
explored during test and verification 
No single layer will function perfectly in producing a safe and reliable system. All layers are 
needed to provide the opportunity and coverage necessary to assure that the details have been 
adequately considered.  Proper application of process at each layer provides the affirmative body 
of evidence that the system is safe and ready to fly. 
Figure i-5 Multilayered Approach to Produce a Safe and Reliable System and Screen for 
Potential Problems 
x Dense and diverse nets with solid supporting poles serve as barriers or screens preventing 
hazards from causing accidents or mishaps 
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x Multiple imperfections in the nets or supporting poles may allow hazards to result in 
accidents or mishaps 
x Avoid inducing hazards or latent failures into sensitive system elements by processing steps 
The poles that support the nets in Figure i-5 are critical to their integrity and effectiveness. 
Development of a safe and reliable system requires access to experience, team members who 
understand the mission needs and objectives, have curiosity, skepticism, and imagination to 
identify what can go wrong, and can assure good communications among team members and 
suppliers. It is the role of program management to assure that the objectives are communicated, 
appropriate experience is applied, and that the team is encouraged to communicate safety and 
reliability issues.
7. Integrating Risks Throughout the Life Cycle (Sections 2.5 and 3.0) 
Seek and collect warning signs and precursors to safety, mission success, and development risks 
throughout the life cycle, and integrate those into a total risk picture with appropriate mitigation 
activities. 
An integrated risk management assessment process throughout all phases of the system’s life 
cycle is essential to achieving a safe and reliable system. Early identification and resolution of 
potential problems is key to effective application of technical, cost, and schedule resources. Each 
layer within the multilayered approach provides a mechanism for identifying and collecting 
warning signs and precursors to conditions that could impact safety and reliability. Tracking and 
trending these warning signs throughout the life cycle is key to acknowledging and quantifying 
the risk.    Team members must pay particular attention to these warning signs and affirmatively 
resolve them with rationale describing why the system is safe.  
Sometimes risk is accepted and accumulated in small increments. Each of the individual risk 
increments by itself may not appreciably increase total risk. However, a large number of small 
risks can aggregate, couple, amplify, and combine to a much higher risk state. Risk management 
activities should recognize this effect and provide a mechanism to inform decision makers of the 
total aggregate risk. 
Distinguishing risks by their “safety,” “mission success,” and “development/programmatic” 
consequence types encourages the team to discuss and focus on what is at stake.  Decision 
makers can then integrate a total project risk picture and can decide where to apply resources. 
Distinguishing among these risks types can help teams make difficult choices when evaluating 
safety versus mission success versus development risks. 
A total risk picture allows informed deployment of technical, cost, and schedule resources to 
obviate or mitigate risks. Figure i-6 shows how risk information flows from different sources and 
is evaluated in total.  
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Figure i-6 Risk Information Flow 
x Team identifies risk by consequence using targeted methods 
x Risk management boards integrate and rank risks 
x Decision makers apply technical, cost, and schedule resources to maintain an acceptable 
level of risk 
x Risk reduction plans and activities feedback to development and operational activities 
x Risks reported to management and team members
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Some of the elements critical to producing safe and reliable systems require the following 
emphasis in risk management: 
x Integrate a total risk picture from each contributory increment of risk.  
x Provide a method of distinguishing, comparing, evaluating, and prioritizing risks with 
differing and sometimes competing consequences to allow informed application of 
technical, cost, and schedule resources to obviate or mitigate risks. 
x Foster curiosity, skepticism, and imagination to identify risks, seek warning signs, and 
precursors to potential failures and problems. Encourage an integrated team of designers, 
operators, crew, safety, and reliability analysis personnel to assess risks from balanced 
optimistic and skeptical viewpoints. 
x Start risk assessments early in the life cycle in a top down fashion to provide the highest 
opportunity to obviate and mitigate risk while a wide range of opportunity exists at low 
cost.  Remember and revisit the top down perspective later on the life cycle. 
x Validate system risk assessments with historical knowledge of failures and their causes in 
comparable systems. 
x Identify residual risks, close calls, anomalies, or issues that do not have a definitive cause 
or corrective action, and where their reoccurrence can result in significant safety and 
mission success consequences.  Utilize affirmative rationale and data grounded in the 
scientific method to support flight readiness assessments. 
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Conclusions
The guiding principles, applied at the system and subsystem level along the life cycle, seek a 
design that is safe and reliable. A necessary ingredient will be the leadership to ensure that 
safety, reliability, robustness, and fault tolerance are incorporated into the design and the end 
item at all levels. Integrating the various system elements into a cohesive whole and assuring the 
integrated system is safe remains a prime challenge to the engineering and management teams. 
Therefore, the resulting system must be a combined effort of systems, subsystems, and 
component engineering, manufacturing, S&MA, test, and operations teams that execute the 
“right” processes at the “right” time” throughout the system life cycle. The team should be led 
with a management philosophy that fosters a safety focus along the life cycle and encourages 
open communications for surfacing and resolving safety concerns with affirmative evidence that 
the system is safe to fly. 
Figure i-7 shows one way the methodologies discussed in this executive summary integrate into 
an overall view of what is done to ensure a safe and reliable system. The safety focus along the 
life cycle and team forms the foundation. The seven principles described above rest on this 
foundation and synergistically guide the development of a safe and reliable system. 
Figure i-7 Guiding Principles Applied to End-to-End Development of a Safe and Reliable 
System
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1.0 Introduction 
NASA is in the process of designing the next generation crewed exploration-type space flight 
missions.  The previous generation, the Space Shuttle, was designed more than 30 years ago, 
with a different set of mission/functional requirements.  In fact, this new design is expected to be 
far more like the first generation Mercury/Gemini/Apollo Missions than that of the Shuttle.  The 
optimum methodology for specifying requirements for mission success and crew safety are now 
under consideration.
What factors should be considered in establishing such requirements? This question prompted 
the Astronaut Office at NASA JSC to commission this report under the auspices of the NESC.  A 
team was chartered by the NESC Systems Engineering Office (SEO) (refer to Appendix B) to 
assess best practices for developing a crewed space vehicle that ensures safety of the crew and is 
both reliable (free of failures throughout its mission) and robust (tolerant of unexpected 
conditions should they arise).  The existing NESC discipline Super Problem Resolution Teams 
(SPRT) were leveraged extensively to capture agency knowledge and best practices, particularly 
in systems and processes that drive system safety and reliability.  Outside organizations, such as 
The Aerospace Corporation, Draper Laboratory, Valador, and Bay Engineering, were utilized in 
the gathering of relevant historical systems data, best practices in design, verification, and 
assessment of reliability.  Copious references are included, which benchmark documents across 
the aerospace industry, both inside and outside NASA, for the further insight.   
To cover the wide range of considerations of designing for safety and mission success, this report 
is divided into the major sections listed below, along with questions that were asked of the NESC 
by the astronaut office.   
Section 1.0 – Historical Perspective 
x Which systems have been reliable?  
x Which systems have required redundancy?
x How did the reliability mature for Apollo, Space Shuttle Program (SSP), and ISS within 
each system? 
Historical information can provide helpful guidance on how to make future spacecraft as 
successful as possible.  This section will provide an overview of how missions including Apollo, 
Shuttle, and ISS, have handled safety and reliability and provide an examination of known 
causes of space mission failures.
Section 2.0 – System Engineering with a Safety and Reliability Focus 
Section addresses the following questions: 
x What methods are there for designing-in and assuring reliability of critical Earth-to-orbit 
systems?  
x How is it known where redundancy is and is not required?
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x Which types of systems are highly reliable without redundancy and which systems 
require redundancy in order to achieve high reliability?
x How are the reliability requirements specified?  
Achieving a safe and reliable system requires an intently focused effort at every phase of the life 
cycle.  This approach entails following a sound design process with emphasis on safety and 
reliability drivers at each life cycle phase.  The process must be based on the foundational 
principles of safety and reliability.  Elements of the process are illustrated in Figure i-1.  Section 
2.0 will address Systems Engineering (SE) technical considerations and methods for 
apportionment of project-level resources throughout the design process flow.  These sections 
seek to describe methodologies for how to design mission success into a program from the 
ground up.  Where and why redundancy is applied will be discussed with the recognition that 
mission success is far more complex than the simple application of redundancy.  Section 2.0 
subsections are described herein. 
x Section 2.1, “The Right Work at the Right Time with the Right Teams:”  Before even 
getting started, System Engineers must stress the importance of setting simple and 
concise objectives, following the right process, and performing the right functions when 
they are needed.  Results of trades performed early in the life cycle have a significant 
influence on systems safety and reliability as well as costs. None of this can be achieved 
without the right teams that are properly integrated.  Getting the right teams in place is 
critical to the entire SE process. 
x Section 2.2, “Defining the Requirements for a Safe Human Rated System:”  The overall 
objective for specifying requirements for human rated systems is to provide guidance for 
design and a basis to verify that the system, once produced, is safe.  The integrated teams 
must understand this philosophy from the beginning, as this requirement will effect all 
aspects of the system including:  redundancy schemes, backup systems, abort systems, 
and operational procedures.
x Section 2.3, “Conceiving the Right System, Critical Activities Early in the Life Cycle:” 
There are key activities that must be performed early in the design process.  A risk-based 
system design loop is a key component in this early development as this loop attempts to 
converge on a set of self-consistent requirements, design, and operations concept.  The 
requirements set the stage for the design and are based on the mission objectives.  This 
loop also helps to put emphasis on the design drivers and strives to maintain the simplest 
design architecture to avoid unnecessary complexity that increases risk. 
x Section 2.4, “Implementing the System Right, Achieving a Reliable System:” After the 
architecture has been defined, the concept selected must be matured into hardware, 
software, logistics, etc. through the design process. This is a major activity that is based 
on classical SE practices with a focus on technical integration of system, subsystem, and 
component designs. The system, subsystems, and components are integrated by SE using 
validation, trades, risks and sensitivity studies. In addition to providing a brief overview 
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of the design process, this section will discuss a multilayered approach for developing a 
safe and reliable system. 
x Section 2.5, “Integrating Risk:” An integrated risk management process must pervade all 
phases of the system’s life cycle.  This process provides Program management with 
information necessary to identify, understand, and evaluate risk trades throughout the life 
of the Program.  This section provides a systems perspective of integrating risks from 
multiple sources utilizing different methods to obviate or mitigate the highest risk when 
considering technical, cost, and schedule.
Section 3.0 – Safety and Reliability Analysis throughout the Life Cycle 
This section will address the role of safety and reliability analysis throughout the design process 
flow from Pre-Phase A to Phase E.  There will be a focus on reliability assessments during each 
phase, and what inputs are needed to perform a proper reliability assessment.  In addition to 
discussion about performing the reliability assessments, details are provided on how to use 
reliability assessments during each phase, and how these assessments and analyses evolve 
throughout the design process.
Sections 4.0 - 12.0 – Domain Engineering with a Safety and Reliability Focus 
Discipline areas provide perspective on those aspects of the DDT&E process that are most 
critical or unique to their part of the system to ensure safe and reliable design, based on the 
extensive experience of team members, accepted industry practice (including standards), and 
lessons learned from preceding missions.  Discipline sections are organized to correlate with the 
SE perspective identified in Section 2.0, as follows: 
1.  Interfaces within and outside their subsystem 
2.  History relevant to reliability and robustness 
3.  Architecture 
a.   Trade studies, along with evaluation criteria necessary to converge design, 
operations concept, and derived requirements 
b.   Reliability drivers 
c.   Technical integration at system level  
4.  Design, Build, and Operations 
a.    Best practices 
Also included in each of the sections is a list of “indicators,” factors by which an observer can 
judge whether a design is reliable and robust.
In summary, this report gathers information necessary to assess and document the prevailing 
methodologies for maximizing and assessing critical spacecraft systems safety and reliability.  
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This report is not intended to duplicate or update existing references and is not intended to 
replace existing standards and policy. 
1.0.1 Definitions
Cascade Failures: Multiple failures that occur because the consequence of one failure results 
and cascades into the failure of another system element. 
Common Cause Failure:  The failure of multiple items occurring from a single cause that is 
common to all of them.  
Common Mode Failure: The failure of multiple identical items that fail in the same mode. Note 
that common mode failures are a particular case of common cause failures.
Dependent Failure: A failure whose likelihood is not random and dependent upon another 
system element or environment. A dependent failure is a failure of a component or system that is 
not statistically independent of another failure. That is, its probability of failure is different if 
another component has failed.
Failure:  A required function or specified service of a system, device, software, or system 
operator ceases 
Fault:  An incorrect state of hardware or software resulting from failures of components, 
functional upsets, operator error, or incorrect design. Faults include failures of system elements. 
Fault/Failure Tolerance:  The ability to operate/survive in the presence of faults or failures 
Fault/Failure Avoidance:  The potential for faults/failures are obviated or mitigated through 
screening processes. 
Independent Failure: A failure whose likelihood is random and not dependent upon another 
system element or environment. An independent failure is a failure of a component or system 
that is statistically independent of other failures. 
Malfunction:  A failure is a cessation of operation; in a malfunction, the system continues to 
operate but in an unexpected manner.  
Mission Success: Accomplishment of mission objectives and meeting mission requirements
Quality:  “The totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its 
ability to satisfy stated or implied needs.” [ISO8402] Quality is characteristic that a component 
or system possesses at a fixed point in time, usually at the beginning of life. 
Reliability:  The ability for the system to continue to perform its function over its mission time. 
Reliability is introduced into the design by the establishment of margin against the operational 
environment. While quality is necessary it is not sufficient to indicate that, the unit will function 
over time in its operational use and environment. “The ability of an item to perform a required 
function, under given environmental and operational conditions and for a stated period of time.” 
[ISO8402]
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Robustness:  The ability to operate/survive in the presence of an abnormal or unexpected 
environment during operation. Robustness is related to the margin against system limits and its 
insensitivity to changes in the environment and operational sequence. 
Safety:  Protecting against consequences of failure, damage, error, accidents, or any events that 
could be considered dangerous to human life.  Protection can be applied to either the cause or the 
consequence of something that is not safe.
1.1 Historical Context of Space Systems Safety and Reliability
From its inception in the late 1950s, the history of spaceflight, particularly human spaceflight, 
has been distinguished by engineers accepting complex and demanding challenges to the edge of 
imagination and then meeting those challenges.  Early on, developing and operating systems to 
venture into unknown territory beyond the friendly confines of Earth has challenged the best 
minds that the United States had to offer, as well as the utmost in government and industrial 
capability.  Such efforts achieved a high level of success, with but a few unfortunate instances of 
failure. 
In the case of the Apollo 1 fire no one had “imagined,” as Frank Borman noted, the hazard of 
common materials in a high-pressure oxygen environment resulted in a highly flammable and 
dangerous situation for that ground test configuration.  Apollo 13 on the other hand demonstrated 
how a ground test set up could compromise the reliability of the flight system, and that 
flexibility, robustness, human ingenuity, and creativity can overcome serious obstacles to safely 
return the crew to Earth. 
During the mid-1980s through the 1990s, a disturbing trend of increasing robotic spacecraft 
failures and two highly visible Shuttle failures occurred.  This report attempts to convey or 
reinforce the keystones of mission success, in safety and reliability terms, to the designers and 
operators of the new generation of crewed space systems. 
A brief look back at the history of spaceflight and how safety and reliability approaches evolved 
will help determine where to go from here.  Early in space exploration there was limited 
knowledge and confidence in space systems hardware performance in the space environment.  At 
the time of Alan Shepard’s Freedom 7 mission in 1961, powered air travel of any kind was less 
than half a century old.  Robert Goddard had launched the first liquid fueled rocket only 35 years 
prior to Shepard’s flight!  Large booster rockets had relatively low performance and were not 
entirely reliable.  Complex electronics were new and individually unreliable.  Astronauts were 
exclusively military test pilots flying high-risk missions.  However, protecting their lives was of 
paramount concern. 
NASA set about a program to develop missions with high system reliability. Methods were 
continually being devised to recover from potential failure or preclude it altogether.  Since the 
ability to predict performance was rudimentary, equipment was over designed with high margins.  
System reliability was achieved through extensive test programs and judicious use of redundant 
components, crew intervention, or ground command to recover from a box failure.  As Apollo 13 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
32 of 133 
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
showed, however, malfunction is not always due to random box failure that could be mitigated 
by redundancy.  The application of diverse systems or the alternate use of existing systems at the 
sacrifice of performance, such as a Launch Escape System, should also be considered by design 
rather than relying on happenstance and ground crew resourcefulness. 
As flights increased, our understanding of vehicle behavior increased.  With understanding, 
thanks in large part to the advent of large-scale digital computers and the software to command 
them, the ability to accurately predict performance increased, allowing design margin 
requirements to decrease.  Tests that may once have been considered crucial verifications, but 
having shown few failures lately, were omitted.5,6  In some cases, where knowledge and 
experience had been accumulated, attempts to control costs resulted in the omission of  
specifications and standards,.  Cost and schedule pressures also resulted in less focus on SE with 
sometimes significant adverse consequences. 
As this section has described, safety and reliability approaches have evolved in the past 35 years.
Table 1.1-1 summarizes how each of the major human spaceflight systems, robotic spacecraft, 
and aircraft has generally addressed reliability requirements and implementation approaches.  As 
evidenced in the table, differences in approach to the implementation of crew safety and 
reliability requirements exist across programs.  This is because fault tolerance is a functional 
requirement applied at the mission level, not a hardware requirement.  That is, for any given 
function the mission must perform, the prescribed number of faults (currently two for crewed 
missions) must not result in loss of crew, but may result in reduced performance.  There are a 
number of possible techniques by which fault tolerance requirements can be satisfied, using 
redundancy and/or diversity, or waived by employing ultra-highly reliable components or 
systems.  Which techniques are selected for any given mission is a function of a number of 
factors, including constraints (size, weight, power, and cost), technology readiness level (TRL) 
of hardware, predicted reliability, crew in-the-loop architecture, etc.  Sections 2.0 and 3.0 will 
address how these factors influence mission acquisition, including reliability requirements.  
Section 2.2 discusses potential reliability requirements.  The discussions are based in the various 
approaches adopted by the programs listed in Table 1.1-1.  How these projects specified their 
reliability requirements influenced the recommendations in Section 2.2. 
5 Tosney, W., Faster, Better, Cheaper, The Aerospace Corporation, Nov 8 2000 
6 Tosney, W., Quintero, A, Orbital Experience from an Integration and Test Perspective, The Aerospace 
Corporation, Journal of the IEST, Nov/Dec 1988 
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Table 1.1-1 Comparison of Historical Reliability Approaches 
Ref 1 French, John C. Mercury Project Summary SP-45, Chapter 6 Reliability and Flight Safety 
Ref 2 Gemini Mid Program Conference, Spacecraft Reliability and Qualification, Chapter 10, 2/23/1966 
Ref 3 Hershkowitz, B.H, Apollo Technical Manual, Reliability, ARM-10, 10/15/1963 
Ref 4 FAA 25.1309, Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A 
Ref 5 F-16 Systems Safety Handbook, 16PR361 http://www.f-16.net/varia_article5.html 
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1.2 Examination of Failure History Data 
Space missions are among the most difficult endeavors undertaken by humans.  Despite the best 
efforts of a government/industry partnership comprised of a skilled and dedicated workforce, 
there are occasionally failures.  Extensive anomaly data was evaluated to assess the origin of 
space vehicle failures.  Along with data from The Aerospace Corporation Space Systems 
Engineering Database and Rome Air Development Center (1985), failure investigation 
documentation was also examined for guidance, including: 
x The President’s Commission of the Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission) 
x The Columbia Accident Investigation (CAIB) Report 
x The Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task 
Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (Young Commission) 
Another valuable resource in understanding space mission failures is The Aerospace 
Corporation’s 100 Questions for Technical Review.  In this document, the author has described, 
in a consistent summary method, catastrophic anomalies that have resulted in mission loss along 
with their established root cause.  That data is used to develop questions that a prospective 
project reviewer should ask to determine whether a mission is likely to be prone to repeating the 
same mistake. 
It should be noted that correlation to an overriding specific deficiency is not always obvious 
from the data and there is a concern that the relative infrequency of failures may not allow for a 
statistically valid data set. However, there are trends that can be inferred from the available data.  
The following paragraphs will identify and interpret significant trends from past space vehicle 
failures.  A summary list of observations follows. 
• Electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts failure rates are decreasing. 
• Proper application of EEE parts in multi chip modules (MCM), hybrids and printed 
circuit boards remain a challenge. 
• No single subsystem is immune from failure. 
• Proper testing is key to mission success. 
• Failures are likely if initial cost and schedule allocation are not scoped appropriately for 
the project's complexity. 
• Anomalies must be thoroughly understood. 
• The lack of proper standards, contractor oversight, and test will cause an increase in 
failures. 
• Software Failure Rates are increasing. 
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• Design, Environment, Parts, and Workmanship account for the majority of the failure 
causes seen today. 
1. Mission Phase and Risk:  Figure 1.2-1 shows all known human spaceflight failures, both 
catastrophic and significant, as a function of relative mission timeline.   Figure 1.2-1 shows that 
failures can occur at any time and significant failures have occurred during on-orbit operations. It 
can be inferred that space vehicle robustness precluded a number of significant failures from 
becoming catastrophic. Unlike ascent and entry, the crew has time to evaluate, troubleshoot, and 
respond to on-orbit failures (i.e., Apollo 13).  One notable statistic in Figure 1.2-1 is that loss of 
crew has only occurred during ascent and re-entry, the two most dynamic phases of a mission.  
During high risk, highly dynamic phases of missions it is important to include response time and 
automation into redundancy and backup reliability trades.   Sections 2.0 and 3.0 will discuss the 
importance of considering the different aspects involved in all mission phases when selecting 
architectures and when deciding where to buy down risk.
Figure 1.2-1 Significant Human Space Vehicle Failures 
Ref: OSP-ELV Human Flight Safety Certification Study Report 
      Legend:      Red Outline Box = Loss of Crew 
               Yellow or Orange = Crew Health Threatened 
           Green Outline = Significant Event / Close Call, Crew Unaffected 
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2. EEE Part Failure Rates:  An area with a clear trend in failure data examined is electronic 
piece parts.  As Figure 1.2-2 shows, individual parts failure rates have undergone a significant 
reduction over time due to improved manufacturing techniques.  However, the investigation also 
found that, when individual piece parts are aggregated into higher-level components, such as 
hybrids, MCMs, and other sealed cavity assemblies, reliability related problems are disturbingly 
high.  Recent examples include hybrid DC-DC converters and solid-state switches.   
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the use of physics-based modeling and other modern computer 
aided design tools allows application of components closer to the manufacturers' published 
limits.  This reduces the margin available to accommodate off-nominal conditions and statistical 
variation of components.  This places renewed emphasis on the proper application and derating 
of EEE parts. Highly accelerated life testing (HALT) can be used to increase robustness; 
particularly for electronics parts and assemblies exposed to harsh environments. 
Figure 1.2-2 Individual Parts Failure Rates 
3. Adequacy of Testing:  Spaceflight missions rely heavily on testing to uncover defects in 
either design or workmanship prior to launch.  Mission success is directly related to the rigor of 
its test program, as shown in Figure 1.2-3.   The figure shows Class A missions that follow 
rigorous testing to MIL-STD-1540 have a lower failure rate than programs with less rigorous 
testing.  A test program that adheres to the principles, if not the letter, of MIL-STD-1540 is far 
more likely to be successful than one that does not.  Section 2.4 provides further explanation on 
the need for incorporating full test programs. 
L. Sarsfield, Cosmos on a Shoestring, Appendix D, p140
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Figure 1.2-3 Test Assessment and Risk Management 
Aerospace Institute Course, W. H. Tosney, 2005 
4. Complexity of Systems:
Many believe that there is a critical level of complexity, which will almost assure system failure 
since, at some point; even the best Program Manager will not be able to keep track of the true 
Program status.  Critical flaws will find their way into either the design or operating procedures.   
Studies clearly indicate that more complex missions that have not been allocated additional 
acquisition cost and schedule based on complexity, have a higher likelihood of failure as 
presented in Figure 1.2-4.  There are two ways to interpret the graphs. One interpretation is that a 
complex mission must be provided adequate budget and sufficient time to be successful.  Some, 
however, would argue that this is not what the data actually shows.  Another interpretation 
suggests that if a mission is sufficiently complex, it will probably fail.  While it is unlikely that 
either of these extreme positions is always correct, the data clearly shows a strong correlation 
between mission complexity and mission risk.  Thus, it is prudent to limit complexity to the 
minimum required to accomplish the mission objective.  
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Spacecraft Cost as Function of Complexity
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Figure 1.2-4 A Complexity-Based Risk Assessment of Low-Cost Planetary Missions:  When 
is a Mission Too Fast and Too Cheap (David A. Bearden, Fourth IAA International 
Conference on Low-Cost Planetary Missions, JHU/APL, Laurel, MD, May 2-5, 2000)
5. Reliance on Past Successes: Rather than the tracing of each flight anomaly to root cause and 
objectively assessing its risk to mission success, an outlook has developed whereby past 
performance is thought to be indicative of future success.  This is clearly not the case.  
Anomalies must be thoroughly understood in the context of mission success and crew safety. 
Corrective action should be taken to ensure that those so indicated are rectified such that they do 
not reoccur. In the cases where identifying a definitive cause or implementing a definitive 
corrective action is not possible, affirmative evidence grounded in the scientific method must be 
supplied to justify the system is safe to fly. Both the Rodgers Commission Report on Challenger 
and the CAIB Report on Columbia caution against relying on apparent past success as an 
indication of safety especially in areas where off-nominal conditions that threatened safety did 
not initially result is a serious problem. 
6.  Reduced Visibility during Acquisition:  In the 1990s, the industry underwent a major 
modification in prevailing acquisition philosophy, called “Faster, Better, Cheaper” in NASA and 
“Acquisition Reform” in the Department of Defense (DoD).  In these approaches, limits were 
placed on cost and schedule, while performance expectations were kept the same or increased.  
To achieve those goals, the requirements process was reduced, military and government 
standards were no longer levied on contracts, testing was reduced, oversight was reduced or 
eliminated and not replaced with sufficient “insight,” and SE reduced to virtual nonexistence.  As 
a result, billions of dollars of space hardware was lost to failure, as shown in Figure 1.2-5.  Both 
NASA and DoD are currently in the process of reverting to proven practices. 
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Figure 1.2-5 A Successful Strategy for Satellite Development and Testing  
W. H. Tosney & S. Pavlica, Aerospace Corporation Crosslink, Fall 2005 
7. Software Development Processes:  As reliance on software in space systems increases, so 
does the incidence of failure caused by its malfunction, as shown in Figure 1.2-6.  The role and 
causes of software failures and anomalies, as well as technical development deficiencies, in 
spacecraft accidents is well documented in the “Role of Software in Spacecraft Accidents.”7
Examples cited are poor or missing specifications, unnecessary complexity and software 
functionality, inadequate reviews, ineffective systems safety engineering flaws in test and 
simulation environments, and inadequate human factors design.  The author cites both 
management and organizational factors, such as diffusion of responsibility and authority and 
poor information flow as sources of software failures and anomalies. This reference also 
attributes many of theses factors to a “Faster, Better, Cheaper” acquisition approach.
7 Levenson, Nancy G., Role of Software in Spacecraft Accidents, Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 41, No. 4, 
July-August 2004 
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Figure 1.2-6 Flight Failures with Software as Major Cause 
8.  Following Proper SE Practices:  In the last fifteen or so years, Mishap Investigation Boards 
(MIB) have often identified failure to follow proven and established SE processes as an 
underlying cause of flight failures.  For any new acquisition, it is imperative to recover and use 
processes that have been demonstrated to achieve mission success, and identify and recruit 
management and technical staff that have experience designing, producing, and operating space 
missions using established SE processes.  Succeeding sections devote significant explication to 
the SE process and its application in light of these lessons learned.
9. Failure Causes:  Figures 1.2-8 and 1.2-9 show the distribution of failure causes from two 
different data sets. The distribution of failure causes between the two reports varies because of 
different missions in the data sets and differences in the classification categories. However, both 
sets indicate that design, environment, parts, and workmanship/quality make up a majority of the 
failures causes. Since the available data on parts and workmanship failures are insufficient to 
differentiate between generic and random causes, it is important to understand the nature of these 
failures and how they can be prevented or mitigated.  Design problems are most likely generic, 
since they will be present in all units.  Similarly, problems related to the environment are generic 
to all units as they are rooted in the inability of the system as designed to function in the actual 
space environment.  Workmanship problems can be due to either random escapes or problems 
with the manufacturing processes or paperwork potentially making the cause generic.  Similarly, 
parts problems can be because of a random defect that escaped detection or misapplication 
(design or part characterization) resulting in stress and early failure.  Section 2.2 discusses how 
the system design might respond in a tolerant and robust fashion to both generic and random 
failures through the use of redundancy, backups, or other means appropriate to the failure. 
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Figure 1.2-7 Orbital Experience from an Integration and Test Perspective  
Journal of the IEST, W. F. Tosney & A. H. Quintero, Nov./Dec. 1998 
Figure 1.2-8 Reliability Prediction for Spacecraft, RADC-TR-85-229
Rome Air Development Center, H. Hecht & M. Hecht, December 1985 
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10. Historical Trend of Subsystem Failures: Historically, no subsystem has been immune 
from failures. One of the questions asked of this report seek to identify if any subsystem has 
reliability or safety trends that warrant different approaches during design. One caution inherent 
in the interpretation of historical data is that if subsystem does have a failure, processes are put in 
place to rectify the problem. 
Figure 1.2-9 depicts the distribution of failures to spacecraft subsystems. The study shows that 
no subsystem has an insignificant number of failures or is immune to failure. Therefore, any 
subsystem has the potential to result in mission failure. Sub-systems that have safety critical 
functions need the appropriate attention to meet safety and reliability requirements. 
Payload
Structures & 
Materials
Guidance,  
Navigation, 
& Control
Propulsion
Communication
Software
Thermal
Command & 
Data Handling
Unknown
Electrical Power 
83 failures out of 
~ 2000 launches 
Figure 1.2-9 Analysis from Aerospace Corporation Space Systems Engineering Database 
(SSED)
11. Reliability and Maturity: Figure 1.2-10 plots an analytical estimate of reliability and 
probability of success based on flight experience. Reliability improvement is due to accumulated 
flight experience and the discovery and correction of unexpected failure modes. As the number 
of flights increase, uncertainties in the operational environment are reduced, how the system 
interacts with the environment becomes better known, and generic problems are corrected. These 
factors contribute to reliability improvement. An underlying assumption for failure-free systems 
is that one failure would occur in three times the number of failure-free flights. 
When modeling reliability and considering failure rates, one must take into account the fact that 
the early flights will be less reliable than a mature vehicle until latent generic issues are 
corrected. The first flights have a higher failure probability until uncertainties are reduced and 
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“unknown unknowns” become known. Section 2.2 discusses techniques for mitigating the 
consequences of unexpected failures and Section 3.4 discusses reliability modeling. 
Figure 1.2-10 Demonstrated Launch Vehicle Reliability Improvement with Maturity, 
Space Launch Vehicle Reliability, I-Shih Chang, Aerospace Crosslink, Winter 2001 
History shows that safe and reliable spacecraft can be achieved.  Following proper SE practices 
and understanding the lessons learned over time by the space industry are critical in meeting this 
goal.  With the understanding that failures cannot be totally avoided, it is paramount to put into 
place an approach that emphasizes safety and reliability in the design.  The remaining sections of 
this report will discuss the key considerations during architecture development and multilayered 
approach designed to assure the system works as intended. 
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2.0  System Engineering with a Safety and Reliability Focus
SE plays a critical role in ensuring a system’s ultimate safety and reliability. Project teams can 
achieve these goals by maximizing the leverage and power of the early iterative design cycles 
conceiving the design, following proven practices for implementing the chosen design, and being 
alert to warning signs and risks. 
Section 2.0 describes a method for achieving these goals from a top down perspective driven by 
mission objectives and risk.  Figure 2.0-1 demonstrates how the topics and key considerations, 
described in the five subsections of Section 2.0, fit together to achieve safe, reliable, and failure 
tolerant systems. 
Figure 2.0-1 Conceiving the Right System and Implementing the System Right 
Safety and reliability as presented in this report has a broader meaning than just crew safety.  It 
includes mission reliability and “defect free” quality hardware and software. 
This report distinguishes between safety and mission success to provide a consequence-based 
focus that is useful during design, production, operations, and overall risk management. 
Distinguishing between safety and mission success is important when deciding when the mission 
should be aborted to preserve crew safety and when efforts to preserve mission success may 
adversely impact safety. 
A safe system ensures the survival, health, and well being of the crew during nominal and off-
nominal operational scenarios. It also provides strategies to avoid or deal with unsafe conditions 
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and applies margin to the system to prevent the exceedance of limits that may result in harm to 
the crew. 
A reliable system assures mission success by functioning properly over its intended life. It has a 
low and acceptable probability of failure, achieved through simplicity, proper design, and the 
proper application of reliable parts and materials.  In addition to long life, a reliable system 
is robust and fault tolerant, meaning it can tolerate failures and variations in its operating 
parameters and environments. 
A system’s reliability is strongly dependant upon its design and is not assured by quality alone.
Quality is a characteristic that a system possesses at a fixed point in time, usually at the 
beginning of life.  While quality is necessary for reliability, it is not sufficient. 
Reliability includes the following characteristics:  
x Free from design or workmanship flaws effecting safety and mission success to the extent 
practical given available resources 
x Tolerant of remaining defects should they surface over time 
x Robust to unexpected interactions and environments as they surface over time 
Safety and reliability objectives often work together but can also compete. The two work 
together when margins are added to the system to ensure its continued operation from both safety 
and mission success perspectives. They compete when safety objectives seek to prevent a 
hazardous condition that also interrupts mission success.  For example, a human rated system 
would set safety limits, such as engine red lines prior to the point of failure in order to allow a 
crew abort scenario. An early or false abort may occur at the expense of mission success. 
Objective and Overview of the SE Process 
The objective of SE as stated in the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook8 “is to see to it that 
the system is designed, built, and operated so that it accomplishes its purpose in the most cost-
effective way possible, considering performance, cost, schedule, and risk.”  The NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook, SP-6105, provides a solid SE framework and provides an excellent 
reference for engineers and managers and content details will not be repeated here.  This report 
focuses on the aspects of SE that effect reliability and provides additional details not found in 
SP-6105 on how reliability goals influence SE activities.  Reliability is closely tied to safety and 
mission success.  The goal is to ensure the system functions and safely performs as intended over 
the life of the mission. 
Defining the “Box”
The limits for an iterative system design loop can be thought of as the side walls of a three 
dimensional box.  Credible solutions must exist with cost (schedule), (technical) performance, 
8 NASA Systems Engineering Handbook,SP-6105, Shishko, Robert, June 1995, pg. 6 
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and risk constraints.  See Figure 2.0-2 showing the “Box” often utilized to indicate whether a 
given solution is “inside” or “outside” the “Box.” 
Figure 2.0-2 Trade Space and Constraint “Box” Showing Alternatives as a Surface with 
Selected Solution 
Visualizing solutions along cost (schedule), (technical) performance, and risk axes indicates that 
each of these parameters affects the other. Notice that this formulation allows for multiple cost 
effective solutions. Solutions are shown as a surface inside the box constraint walls of figure 2.0-
2. The Systems Engineers Dilemma, taken from Section 2.3 of SP-6105, indicates at each cost 
effective solution to reduce: 
• Cost at constant risk, performance must be reduced 
• Risk at constant cost performance must be reduced 
• Cost at constant performance higher risks must be accepted 
• Risk at constant performance higher costs must be accepted 
In this context, time in the schedule is often a critical resource; this means, that the schedule 
behaves like a type of cost.
The desire is to find solutions “in the Box” leaving sufficient margin to the limits to allow for 
growth.  How to get there is the challenge.  System engineers must focus analyses and trades on 
“differences that make a difference” relative to mission objectives, rather than a prescribed level 
of fidelity, or modeling capability.  Key drivers that often “make a difference” are detailed in the 
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following sections.  When solutions are “outside of the box,” it is quite difficult to eliminate 
elements of the system to get them “inside the Box.”  Eliminating system elements threatens the 
cohesive nature of the system.  It is therefore often advantageous to start with a minimal system 
and add to it only in the deficient areas or in areas where enhancements provide value needed by 
the system.  
The role of the systems engineer is to make sure that solutions work, are safe, reliable and 
affordable, and that the trade between cost effective solutions are communicated to management.  
SE must be performed in an integrated fashion to achieve cost effective solutions. Trades on 
cost, performance and risk must be integrated, or the resulting requirements and designs will 
likely be sub-optimal or non-realizable.  Programs that do not have an integrated picture of the 
system are doomed to be overtaken by events and become mired in problems with unacceptable 
solutions. 
Achieving a safe and reliable system requires a focused effort at every phase of the life cycle.  
This entails performing the right work at the right time with the right people, establishing 
clear mission objectives, a safe human rating requirement, conceiving a balanced design of 
inherent reliability, like and diverse redundancy, and following sound design and 
implementation processes with emphasis on safety and reliability drivers at each life cycle 
phase.
2.1 The Right Work at the Right Time with the Right Teams 
SE’s task is to find the best balance between program element responsibilities in terms of cost, 
schedule and probability of functional success.  Key participants are designers, crew and ground 
operators, producers of hardware and software, mission planners, and those responsible for 
preflight preparation of teams and flight systems.   The goal is to design a total system that has 
the capability to perform initial missions, gracefully accommodate early flight uncertainties and 
provide high confidence in the ability to safely return crews to Earth from any point in the 
mission; all within cost and schedule constraints.
2.1.1 Defining Program Needs, Objectives, and Constraints 
Defining a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs, objectives, and constraints, 
including safety, can do much to simplify the system and ensure its safety and reliability.  The 
more simply and clearly the mission objectives are defined, the easier the job of validating the 
requirements and system and keeping complexity under control.  
There are two primary reasons for humans to be in space: to get from one place to another and to 
apply their unique intellectual capabilities and adaptable dexterity.  Humans in space require 
special consideration because they are relatively fragile, volumetrically inefficient when 
compared to machines, and require uninterrupted life support, rest and specialized human-
machine interfaces.   In practice, supporting humans in space represents a significant increase in 
space system complexity, mass and volume.   
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Humans in space also significantly alter spacecraft and mission design practices since the safe 
return of humans is always the primary objective.  Therefore, system designs and concepts of 
operations must place a higher priority on preserving the capability to safely return the crew than 
to accomplishing the planned mission objective.   
The primary objectives of the spacecraft and its related systems are derived from the mission that 
is to be performed.  If the mission description is expansive and ill defined it opens the door for 
the attachment of all sorts of additional requirements that will eventually produce a system that 
either cannot be built or, if built, cannot be operated with a high degree of confidence.  If the 
mission objective is kept simple and easy to describe, then the mission objectives can be used to 
defeat unnecessary requirements and capabilities and the overall simplicity of the resulting 
system can be defended (in this case simplicity means as simple as possible given the complex 
nature of the problem).   
Apollo is an excellent example.  A senior Program Manager, interviewed after the successful 
conclusion of the Apollo program, related the following commentary, “The mission was easy to 
define:  Man, the Moon, this Decade.”  So he was always able to able to test the need for each 
proposed requirement by asking, “Does this help get a man on the Moon in this decade and 
return him safely home?”  If the answer was no, then the design would continue without it.   
However, consider the implications of the following mission statement, “Develop a versatile 
system that is capable of being adapted to perform all plausible, but undefined, future missions.”
While such a statement may seem facetious, it is very similar to guidance provided at the 
beginning of STS development.  With such guidance, almost any requirement can be defended 
and the design will grow in complexity without bounds.   
Most programs have mission statements that are somewhere in between these two extremes and 
often require interpretation.  As a result, they are subject to mission creep and the Program 
Office will have a hard time defending decisions that limit capability or reject proposed 
requirements.  When this happens, the results are increased weight, cost, schedule and 
complexity.  Unfortunately, complexity is almost always the antithesis of reliability.  
2.1.2 Organizing and Managing the Program 
Having established an appropriate objective, the next most important step is personnel selection.
To understand the importance of these positions it is necessary to consider the tasks of Program 
Management, the responsibilities of SE and the relationship between them.  These roles are, in 
fact, two sides of the same coin.  Program managers emphasize outcomes and systems engineers 
the means to achieve those outcomes.  Both require vision, not of what to do, but of how to get 
from here to there with available resources and within real world constraints.  In the post Apollo 
era, economic considerations have become as important as technical elegance and make SE 
responsible for not only performance and reliability, but also for the minimum cost and schedule.  
Program Management, then, has responsibility for effective execution.   Both communities must 
develop an intimate familiarity with the mission objective, physics of the task, state-of-the-art of 
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the technology employed, concept of operations, maturity of the design and, most important, the 
professional maturity of government and contractor teams.   
The most effective means of producing successful systems is to put properly prepared and 
professionally competent managers in charge, provide them with adequate resources, challenge 
them with a difficult but doable schedule, and give them sufficient authority to be held 
personally responsible for results. Perhaps the most significant factor in development programs 
is that these managers must intend, and be expected, to remain responsible for results from day 
one through commitment to flight. Experience shows that competent people who accept personal 
responsibility for the final outcome will do more than anything else to find the right balance 
among the plethora of competing demands that must be addressed during development.
Executive management has three critical responsibilities in making this process work.
x Selecting the right objectives, organizational structure, and key personnel is first.
x After selecting the right people, they must ensure that each manager’s authority and 
responsibility are unambiguous, co-aligned, and supported.
x Finally, having delegated authority and responsibility to a team that will be working under 
intense pressure for years, management must provide a safety net by maintaining discipline 
in execution of the Program Plan, ensuring transparency and providing timely independent 
assessments of progress.  Such activities are not bureaucratic, but enable the team to operate 
aggressively while knowing there will be a second set of eyes to help them avoid errors of 
commission and omission.  Through formal reviews and informal communications the 
executive leadership will gain insight into the state of the program and the health of the team 
that is executing it.  In so doing, the probability of identifying and correcting the inevitable 
mistakes will increase, thereby protecting the team, the mission and the agency. 
2.1.3 Planning and Pacing of Work throughout the Life Cycle 
An important element in managing the Program includes applying appropriate focus to the early 
phases of the life cycle. Figure 2.1-1 provides a notional example of the power and leverage 
present in the early phases of the systems life cycle where alternatives and changes are easy to 
consider.  Changes early in the life cycle are easy to implement at low relative cost.  As 
development progresses, changes become harder and more costly to implement.  Post-launch 
changes and fixes become extremely costly.  
Figure 2.1-1 shows that decisions made early in the life cycle set the stage and define the destiny 
for the project going forward. This emphasizes the importance of architecture trades early in the 
life cycle when there is time and opportunity to change.  Reliability analyses performed late in 
the life cycle cannot effectively drive system architectures and conceptual design.  However, 
reliability analyses performed early in the life cycle can drive the architecture. 
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Figure 2.1-1 Planning and Pacing of Work 
                       
Another view describing the importance of early design work is shown in Figure 2.1-2 that 
indicates over 50 percent of the costs for a program is committed by approximately 10 percent of 
the early design work, and over 80 percent of the total costs are committed after 50 percent of the 
cost is incurred. 
Given the importance of the early work in establishing safety and reliability, Section 2.3 of this 
report describes a methodology for performing these critical activities. 
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Figure 2.1-2 Cost Committed versus Cost Incurred 
Symon & Dangerfield, 1980 and Thuesen & Fabrycky, 2001
2.1.4 Teamwork for Producing Safe and Reliable Systems 
The development of an integrated team is especially important to the SE process. Safety, 
reliability and cost analysts must be included in the systems team along with the designers who 
are familiar with the systems capability and reliability drivers for their systems.  Integration of 
NASA personnel in these teams is essential to provide real-time feedback of customer safety and 
reliability considerations.  Safety problems identified after the design is complete puts managers 
in a position of potentially sacrificing safety, adding to mission cost, slipping the schedule, or all 
of these with resulting negative impact on the program.  Designers will respond to the challenge 
of designing a reliable system if they receive the proper support.  While independent oversight of 
these aspects is needed, these processes cannot be effective if separated for the design team. 
It takes a multidisciplinary team to produce and prepare systems that operate in the complex and 
high-risk space environment. It is necessary to follow an orderly and systematic process to 
produce safe systems, but following this process is not sufficient to produce a safe system.  
Project Management, Engineering, and S&MA teams need to work together to design and 
develop systems that work, are safe, and affordable. These team members back each other up 
when identifying and correcting potential problems during development and operations.  
Safety and Reliability Analysts 
The whole project team is responsible for safety and reliability. It is important that design teams 
have organic safety and reliability experts to help design safety into the system, and develop test 
programs. The design team itself should perform reliability and safety analysis functions to 
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achieve a safe and reliable design. To assure that schedule and cost issues do not override 
reliability and safety, the team needs additional support from independent analysts to verify 
safety and reliability requirements are met. These external members provide peer review and 
external support for the internal safety and reliability experts. The external safety and reliability 
requirements verification team should participate in design efforts, test procedure development, 
and review test results if necessary. Most of the effort put forth to assure reliability and safety 
should be within the design team itself, with the external team providing an audit and review 
function.
Team’s Safety Focus 
The organization should support and encourage a safety focus among team members 
including suppliers. Teams focusing on safety and mission success9:
• Place value in safe and reliable hardware  
• Keep curiosity, skepticism, and imagination alive to ask important “What can go 
wrong” type questions while preventing undesirable effects of complacency and 
infallibility.  
• Know that it takes rigor and discipline to achieve safety and mission success and 
expend energy to achieve it.
• Stick to tried and proven methods, values, and principles that form the foundation 
for the processes that achieve safety and mission success.  
• Resist being easily swayed by new “fads” or external pressures to change. 
• Establish and reinforce teamwork through a “multilayered approach” or a “defense 
in depth” for mission success.  
• Understand that “Risk Management” is not a separate discipline from Engineering, 
Mission Assurance or Project Management; all team members practice risk 
management. 
• Understand that “Risk Management” is a technique performed by everyone on the 
team; not something left to “outside analysts” who are called on to “save” the team 
from making mistakes or make up for lapses in engineering and management. 
Multilayered Approach 
Space mission complexity along with the uncertainties in system performance argues for a 
multilayered approach, a defense in depth, to increase the likelihood of fielding a good design 
and identifying/correcting potential problems before they surface in flight.  Team members not 
only support each other, but also provide multiple opportunities to implement the system right. 
9 For additional information: Schmidt, John K. Capt, Characteristics and Assessment of High Reliability 
Organizations, MSC USN Naval Aerospace Medical Institute, and CAIB staff member 
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The effectiveness of the safety focus depends on the following factors depicted as the supporting 
poles in Figure 2.1-3 and described below. 
Figure 2.1-3 Multilayered Approach to Produce a Safe and Reliable System 
x The team’s experience and their access to experienced personnel when needed. Experience 
allows basic principles, proven processes, and valuable lessons from the past to be applied. 
Experience is also increased in a learning organization that evolves its methodologies and 
processes based on feedback from failures, off-nominal conditions and risks. Section 2.5 
describes the importance of collecting and acting on off-nominal conditions and risks. 
x Understanding and accepting the mission objectives and appreciating what can go wrong 
along with the consequences. 
x A focus on safety and reliability with the curiosity, skepticism, and imagination for what 
might go wrong. Curiosity: questioning how systems ought to work, finding out why they do 
not work as expected, following the scientific method.  Skepticism: questioning and finding 
engineering rationale for solutions to assure they are the right ones, keeping complacency 
under control.  Imagination: Astronaut Frank Borman in his 1967 testimony to Congress 
stated that the cause of the Apollo 1 fire was a "failure of imagination." No one, NASA or the 
Contractor, thought about the fire scenario in the spacecraft during the "plugs out" test. 
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x The team should ask, “Why is it safe?” throughout the program life cycle. Affirmative 
answers to these questions create a preponderance of evidence the system is safe to fly. 
Concluding an affirmative in the absence of contrary evidence (“It has never failed before.”) 
must be avoided. Long strings of successes can unintentionally lead to misunderstanding or 
underestimating risks inherent in the system. 
x Free and open discussion of safety issues among all team members and suppliers is critical to 
assuring that all parts of the system receive consistent attention to safety. Communication of 
concerns and issues should freely flow up the chain to allow a system level view and a 
considered response. No team member or organization should unknowingly end up inducing 
a “weak link” into a system’s safety or mission success. Extensive communications also are 
required among the subsystem and discipline teams as they trade and evolve the design. 
Team members need insight, transparency, and penetration into supplier designs, 
manufacturing, quality, and test effectiveness and need to develop a “trust but verify” 
atmosphere focused on the safety and success of the mission even if some of the hardware is 
COTS and/or has proprietary aspects.
Space Flight Awareness Programs 
Space Flight Awareness Programs (SFA) provide an important reminder that all team members 
are responsible for safety and reliability. The unwritten contract described on the SFA Web Site 
says, “No matter how well spacecraft are made, safety margins in space travel will always be 
small.  A space vehicle is only as reliable and safe to fly as the human care that goes into its 
creation.  For that reason, each individual associated with human space flight is party to the 
unwritten contract, “Flight Safety and Mission Success.” SFA uses a variety of motivational 
awards and incentives, along with active education, to effectively remind the entire 
Government/Industry Team of their role in achieving flight safety and mission success. 
Human space projects have utilized a form of the SFA Program as a way to mitigate risk and 
assure safety and mission success. Aspects of SFA, or its predecessor, Pilot Safety, have 
included traditional quality control techniques.  Examples include parts screening or special 
handling of critical parts. 
The future of space flight brings new opportunities and challenges for the SFA Program.  To 
continue to be effective, the Program must keep pace with an ever-changing environment of 
people, systems, and processes that design, build, fly, and support human space flight yet remain 
grounded in the understanding that safety and reliability are the responsibility of each individual. 
2.2 Defining the Requirement for a Safe Human Rated System 
Humans in space require special consideration because they are relatively fragile, volumetrically 
inefficient when compared to machines and require uninterrupted life support, rest and 
specialized human-machine interfaces.   In practice, supporting humans in space represents a 
significant increase in space system complexity, mass and volume.   
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Humans in space also significantly alter spacecraft and mission design practices since the safe 
return of humans is always the primary objective.  Therefore, system designs and concepts of 
operations must place a higher priority on preserving the capability to safely return the crew than 
to accomplishing the planned mission objective.  
A safe and reliable human rated spacecraft system provides a reasonable assurance that the crew 
survives nominal and off-nominal operational scenarios. NASA-STD-3000 Man-Systems 
Integration Standards provides a set of requirements that assure crew survival in the space 
environment including a breathable atmosphere, safe thermal and g-loads, safe radiation 
environment, adequate nourishment, and personal health and hygiene opportunities. 
Assurance of crew survival during off-nominal and failure scenarios leads to requirements that 
seek to prevent faults and assure crew safety in spite of faults.   History, as summarized in Table 
1.0-1, shows a combination of three basic methods for specifying safety: 
x Specify fault tolerance (i.e., X fault tolerance to loss of crew, Y fault tolerance to loss of 
mission) 
x Bound the probability of failure and assess the vulnerability of the design to existing 
internal and external hazards 
x Require adherence to practices that are known to produce safe systems 
Choosing a single method from the three above cannot, by itself, ensure a safe system.  Potential 
pitfalls of taking each of these kinds of requirements individually are: 
• Specifying fault tolerance alone can force the addition of hardware that can decrease 
reliability due to added complexity. 
• Limiting the probability of failure alone can result in unrealistic probabilities and a 
potentially false confidence that the system is safe. Modeling is often imprecise and can 
contain a high degree of uncertainty. 
• Specifying adherence to practices or recipes alone can miss an important aspect not 
totally codified in the process.  
The challenge is to specify the requirement in a manner that achieves the intended result, i.e., a 
“safe” system.  No single technique of providing redundancy, or backup systems, generating a 
fault tree, FMEA, or hazard report, tracking critical items lists, or calculating the probability of 
loss of crew assures actual crew safety.  No single activity such as design, independent review, 
inspection, or testing can by itself assure that the system is safe.  
Ultimately, the requirement for a “safe” system must include and balance requirements in all 
three of the following areas (see Figure 2.2-1): 
1. Fault tolerance at the Program level assessed from a top down functional perspective and flow 
it to lower levels only after it is optimized from the total system perspective. Where meeting 
the desired fault tolerance by design is not practical the acceptance rationale includes a design 
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for minimum risk supported by a quantitative risk analysis described below to assess residual 
risk.
2. The objective of bounding the probability of failure is to encourage a thorough investigation 
into risks including uncertainty and common cause such that the system design decisions and 
underlying risk analysis can be defended. Estimating the likelihood of failure challenges the 
design team to achieve a deeper understanding of the system and its environment, and 
provides a way to make trades when protecting against worst case assumptions cause a design 
to become overly complex or over weight.  The value of a probability estimate is not so much 
contained in the absolute number but in the thorough investigation, debate, and discussions by 
designers and operators about controlling the potential for failures based on their likelihood, 
the history of similar systems, and the uncertainties inherent in the system design. The 
analysis of the system design must consider the integrated whole and include a top down 
assessment. The analyses are most useful for evaluating and comparing design and operations 
alternatives and validating the chosen system design. The purpose of the Probability of failure 
(Pf) requirement is to encourage a balanced design maximizing safety at the system level. The 
quantitative analysis helps designers identify weak links and safety drivers and provides 
rationale where a design for minimum risk approach is taken. To ensure valid comparison 
correct statistical methods should be used to determine probability of failure and include all 
available data sources. 
3. Identify and follow proven practices and processes for design, manufacturing, independent 
review, inspection, test, and operations. Processes can achieve consistency and provide a 
method for following through on details necessary for safety and reliability. Disciplined 
adherence to critical processes is important for achieving the safety and reliability the 
designers intended. 
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Figure 2.2-1 Three Pronged Safety and Reliability Requirement 
Taken together these three elements of the reliability requirement synergistically drive the 
development of a safe system. A system designed with the required fault tolerance, supported by 
probabilistic reliability and risk analyses, produced and operated with attention to the appropriate 
details ensures a safe system.  
Risk Assessment considers the design, its fault tolerance, Pf, uncertainty, common cause effects, 
the operations concept, and all the other sources of risk to the mission including the environment, 
hardware, software, operations, crew, and the ground. The results of the risk assessment are 
evaluated not only by the development team but also by independent peer reviewers. 
Assessing safety and reliability starts at the onset of the program with high level functions and 
continues throughout the life cycle as the design matures and system elements are produced, 
integrated, and prepared for flight. 
2.2.1 Fault Tolerant Requirement 
The two-fault tolerance requirement along with a design for minimum risk option (NPR 8705.2A 
Human Rating Requirements) for human-rated systems is established to ensure that systems are 
safe. This is a good philosophy given that: 1) each of the two failures is unlikely on its own over 
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the mission life, 2) taken in combination two failures are extremely unlikely, and 3) the system is 
not susceptible to a generic failure or other failure that defeats the system’s failure tolerance due 
to a common cause. 
Two-fault tolerance is one way to reduce the impact of a failure within a system that can 
compromise the initial unit and not the back-ups. For two-fault tolerance to be successful, the 
back-up systems must not be compromised by the original failure mode, cause, or hazard.  
Achieving fault tolerance through redundancy does not provide complete protection since most 
space system failures are not caused by a single “random” event that causes failure of only a 
single component.  If failure occurs, it is usually due to a process failure, or “unknown 
unknowns,” that will affect multiple components (e.g., manufacturing flaws, design errors, and 
harsh environments).  Refer to Section 1.1 Failure History for information supporting this 
conclusion.
In some cases, an implementation of a two-fault tolerant requirement can be construed to mean 
that two-fault tolerance is all that is necessary for the definition of a safe system.  Limiting the 
total system requirement to only failure tolerance can allow a developer to assert that there is a 
safe system just because it meets a failure counting or redundancy assessment.  
It is difficult to “pass-down” a two-fault tolerant requirement to lower levels of the design since a 
lot of mitigations occur at the highest level where the systems interact. The integrated mission 
level must establish the overall mitigation strategy and fault tolerance across all available 
systems, and pass specific fault tolerance requirements (0, 1, 2) down once they have been 
optimized by the systems engineer. 
It is important to recognize that fault tolerance requirement is applied at the functional level, not 
the hardware level.  Therefore, fault tolerance must be considered from the top down in a design.  
Fault tolerance must be evaluated at the system level with a deep knowledge to ensure that the 
system will perform in nominal and off-nominal conditions.  If two-failure tolerance is applied at 
too low of a level, within individual elements or subsystems, the resulting addition of mass and 
complexity into the system can result in a decrease of total system reliability. Evaluation of FT 
should encourage the use or alternate application of existing functional capabilities before adding 
complexity to the system in the form of like or diverse systems. For example, the Reaction 
Control System can provide an alternate method for providing propulsion to a main propulsion 
system in some instances, and can provide an alternate method of controlling the thrust vector of 
the engine in addition to engine gimbals. 
SE plays a key role in identifying the best strategies for incorporating failure tolerance into the 
system.  SE should apply a conscious strategy for how fault tolerance is attacking flaws in the 
system, protecting against potential common cause, and “unknown unknowns” (refer to Sections 
2.3, 2.4, and 3.0).
It is important to recognize the difference between the goals of mission success and safety. 
Crewed systems require the crew to return home safely even if the mission cannot be continued. 
The minimal functions required to return home safely are typically much less complex than those 
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required to perform the mission.  This provides an opportunity to use alternative capability 
present in the design or develop simple systems as an independent back-up.  If simplicity is 
maintained, these systems will be easier to develop, test and verify, and have higher reliability.  
Crewed mission systems tend to have a large number of components required for mission 
success. The additive impact of the likelihood of individual failures is such that single fault 
tolerance is required to assure that the mission can go on in the face of a single failure.  This 
might require additional systems, redundant channels, and automation for fault detection and 
isolation.  In cases where the likelihood of failure becomes high (e.g., long duration missions) 
additional channels may be required.  These channels can be implemented through on-line or off-
line spare, or repair.
The first consideration when choosing either like-redundancy or backup is mission continuance. 
To mitigate the consequences of the first failure, redundancy should provide full performance to 
ensure mission success. The system can utilize one, two, three, or as many redundant strings as 
necessary to reach the operational reliability required as long as these additions are within the 
performance constraints, provide mission success value and do not compromise safety. 
After meeting mission success reliability goals, the consideration of backup legs should be 
focused towards ensuring safety.  The focus shifts to assured safe operability and not on 
performance. This almost always implies a diverse approach to minimize the possibility of a 
common cause failure.  Examples of diverse systems to ensure safety are an ejection seat or 
launch escape system versus another engine, a star tracker, and earth limb optical system rather 
than another platform.  The focus also indicates that when there is only one copy of a system 
element then the emphasis should be on safety and not on operational reliability. Lower 
performance with higher reliability is to be preferred for safety provided it does not violate the 
first rule of design, which is “make it work.”  
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2.2.2 Quantitative Requirement and Supporting Analysis 
Bounding the probability of failure encourages a thorough investigation into risks including 
uncertainty and common cause providing justification and rationale so that design decisions can 
be defended. Estimating the likelihood of failure challenges the design team to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the system and its environment.  The value of a probability estimate is not 
contained in the absolute number but in the process of developing it. It is the debate and 
discussions of risks and their likelihood that encourages a thorough investigation by designers 
and operators about controlling the potential for failures based on their likelihood, the history of 
similar systems, and the uncertainties inherent in the system design.  
The analysis of the system design must consider the integrated whole and include a top-down 
assessment. The analyses are most useful for evaluating, comparing design and operations 
alternatives, and validating the chosen system design. The purpose of the Pf requirement is to 
encourage a balanced design maximizing safety at the system level. The quantitative analysis 
helps designers identify weak links and safety drivers, and provides rationale where a design for 
minimum risk approach is taken. 
A quantitative requirement bounding the probability of failure can support the fault tolerance 
requirement. The quantitative requirement along with its supporting analysis allows an 
assessment of risk and a mechanism to rate and rank alternatives. Quantitative requirements and 
their analyses need to include all elements of the total system, even those launched on multiple 
vehicles.
Mission life can drive reliability, design, and test approaches.  Planned six-month lunar missions 
are an order of magnitude longer than Apollo and Shuttle Missions, and the Mars missions will 
be significantly longer than Lunar Missions. Assessing safety and reliability for these longer 
missions requires quantitative assessments for safety and mission success as fault tolerance alone 
may not adequately identify weak points in the system.  
The quantitative requirement can take the form of a success or loss probability expressed on a 
per mission basis. Earlier manned Gemini and Apollo missions used a success probability on a 
per mission basis. Table 1.0-1 in Section 1.1 shows the different philosophies used to define the 
reliability requirements.  
Military and civil aircraft have used the Probability of Loss of Aircraft (PLOA) expressed per 
flight hour.  Because the risk in manned space missions is extremely dependent on mission event 
(i.e., launch versus cruise or loiter), hourly risk estimates may be misleading.  However, long 
duration lunar missions and missions to Mars need to consider failure rate per hour in order to 
estimate a mission level reliability.  
The metric of PLOA is usually expressed in terms of failure probability per flight hour; the data 
in Table 2.2-1 are summarized from Table 1.1-1. What these data indicate is that US-manned 
space missions have a probability of loss of vehicle per flight hour that is of the same order of 
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magnitude as fighter aircraft missions. Commercial aircraft then have a probability of loss of 
vehicle per flight hour is two to three orders of magnitude safer than fighter aircraft. 
Table 2.2-1 Probability of Loss of Aircraft Summary Data 
Vehicle PLOA Probability of Loss of Aircraft  Flight History 
Space Shuttle 7.8e-5 losses per flight hour 2 losses in 25440 flight hours, 1060 days through loss of Columbia 
Apollo Estimated 7.4e-5 to 3.7e-5 losses per hour 
(assuming 1 failure over 2 to 4 times the 
number of flight hours) 
No losses of vehicles or crews in 6760 system manned flight hours (discounting 
Apollo 1, which never flew and one loss of mission, Apollo 13, with successful 
recovery of the flight crew). For the 15 manned Apollo flights (including 3 long-
duration Skylab flights)  
F16 3.9e-5 losses per hour from Table 1.1-1 
Commercial 
Aircraft 
9.1e-7 to 5.6e-8 per flight hour during 
1983-2002 
from Table 1.1-1 
Establishing Failure Rates and Uncertainty 
One key driver in estimating the probability of failure and reliability is the uncertainty in the 
failure rates. Failure rates are dependent upon the maturity of the vehicle, and thus go beyond the 
piece part failure rates provided by MIL-STD-217 and other techniques.  Flight experience 
increases knowledge about system performance and allows the discovery of unknowns. Flight 
performance trends and flight failure history should feed back into design and development 
processes and safety and reliability analyses. It is important to recognize that estimates and 
requirements based on mature systems are likely to be optimistic when applied to manned 
spaceflight with a limited number of missions.  In this case, estimates must be made in the 
context of the overall traffic model that affects system maturity.  See Section 3.4.3 for a 
discussion on modeling maturity. 
Tracking and trending of failure rates should be conducted using analytical tools such as Crow-
AMSAA10 and statistical process control (SPC). 
Failures can occur due to common cause failures, operational sequences, maintenance and other 
induced causes not related to piece part failures. Typical reliability analyses do not consider 
these issues. The systematic approach of a probabilistic risk assessment can consider these if the 
analysis and design teams work together to explore failure causes beyond piece part failures. 
Maturing Estimates along with Design and Operational Maturity 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA), performed along the systems life cycle, provide the 
quantitative analysis showing compliance with the requirement.  To maximize the PRA’s 
effectiveness, it is tailored to the appropriate level of detail given the maturity of the design. 
10 Crow-AMSAA model developed by Dr. Larry Crow for the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity which 
has been incorporated into DoD military handbooks. 
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Considering all program elements is important when calculating probability of mission success 
and safety.  For example, the ISS row of Table 1.0-1 indicates ISS reliability is dependent upon 
maintenance/repair through the supply of parts by other vehicles such as Shuttle.  Shuttle 
availability and its reliability then factor into ISS reliability through establishment of 
maintenance and repair supply lines. 
Reliability analysis early in the life cycle includes an FMEA along with fault tree analysis, 
reliability block diagrams and predictions to help discriminate among design alternatives.  
Quantitative analysis early in the life cycle can use ESDs and event trees to summarize and 
quantify the differences.  Quantitative probabilistic and uncertainty analyses in addition to 
associated internal and external phenomenological analyses are used to highlight the risk 
discriminating differences among design alternatives in design trade studies.  FMEAs, fault trees, 
and reliability block diagrams should be used to support these analyses, but not to replace them. 
Traditional FMEAs are component oriented and bottom up so they are of limited use in the early 
developmental stages.  However, a functional FMEA is an appropriate tool that can be used to 
evaluate potential failure modes even in early development designs.  Properly applied, they focus 
designers and others on avoiding design pitfalls from the beginning of the process. 
As the design becomes more defined after the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), then 
comprehensive FMEAs and quantitative risk models such as detailed PRA are used to better 
represent the forecasted performance of the selected design alternatives and form the basis for 
focusing the developmental test program and for tracking the developmental risk.  
As development, test, and operational issues surface the quantitative analyses are updated to 
identify areas of the system potentially threatening the system reliability requirement. 
Section 3.0 describes the various reliability analysis techniques and how they are applied along 
the systems life cycle. 
2.3 Conceiving the Right System, Critical Activities Early in the Life Cycle 
Early SE activities are critical to defining how the system accomplishes its purpose and how the 
system responds to the unexpected. Early system design activities have a high degree of leverage 
as discussed in Section 2.1. These early trades investigate how the system works, how it remains 
safe, and how it remains affordable. These early trades define how the selected system solution is 
placed in the Cost, Risk, and Performance “Box” discussed earlier in Section 2.0. 
SE activities during Pre-Phase A and Phase A have a dramatic influence on its ability to survive 
the effects of unexpected differences between the designer’s intent and systems behavior, as well 
as system failures. The system architecture defines how the system responds to unexpected 
environments, unplanned operational sequences, and failures. The need for a system to cope with 
“unknown unknowns” is a fact for space systems.  
Architectural and conceptual designs define how system/subsystem elements are interconnected 
and the types of like or diverse functional redundancy available to react to the unexpected 
conditions and to failures. Allocating functions to subsystems including software and selecting 
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redundancy approaches is best accomplished at the system level in an integrated “systems level” 
view.  It is only at the systems level with subsystem participation that the interactions can be 
evaluated.
The overall system architecture design activity involves balancing what is wanted and what is 
not. Assumptions are made early in the life cycle that tend to be linear, based on simple models 
and simple interfaces.  Sometimes initial simplifying assumptions and the real world 
performance of the system result in unwanted interactions when the product is actually 
assembled and operated.  As the design matures and discipline experts proceed with their 
detailed design, the physical non-linear realities start to surface, and may add complexity and 
unintentional interactions.  Systems engineers need to revalidate the system design, the 
compatibility of interfaces and total integrated system performance, safety, and reliability as the 
design matures.  
In addition, the overall design activity involves a margin assessment not only in the traditional 
areas of mass and power, but also in the robustness of the design against potential threats.  The 
available margin to counter these threats is often the key to crew safety.  Margin guards against 
negative consequences resulting from the occurrence of “unknown unknowns,” and these are 
often the primary threats to the crew because they cannot be specifically anticipated and 
accounted for in the design. 
The primary SE objective is to design the system for performance and mission success through 
an iterative loop, evaluating risk drivers, and considering alternative derived requirements, 
design solutions, or operations concepts.
2.3.1 Managing Complexity 
System complexity must be minimized since it is the most significant feature of systems that fail. 
Complexity impedes the designer’s understanding of how various system elements might interact 
and can prevent a full understanding of the integrated system. Human spaceflight operates on the 
boundaries of technological abilities. It is a highly integrated complex activity that requires the 
sequential success of a large number of active subsystems all of which are operating close to 
their limits. As such, a small increase in complexity may have a negative impact on safety and 
reliability. Complexity is the antithesis of reliability, and should be limited to what is needed to 
accomplish the mission objective. 
Increasing Complexity to Achieve Safety and Reliability 
System complexity has a major effect on the system’s reliability.  Care needs to be exercised 
when the system complexity is increased in an attempt to improve safety and reliability. System 
designers need to consider the ultimate effects of complexity on system reliability when 
additional units or redundancy are added to the system.  Predictions are useful for evaluating the 
relative effects of alternate architectures on system reliability. Redundancy is often mistakenly 
limited to considering identical unit replication or adding another string or strings.  This 
simplistic approach will often not suffice especially in complicated interacting systems that are 
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weight and cost constrained. An integrated approach considering common cause is needed and 
described in Section 2.3.2. 
Managing and Integrating Pieces into a Cohesive Whole 
A common method for managing large and complex systems is to divide the whole into smaller, 
simpler "manageable" pieces, and allow separate groups to individually produce those pieces. 
The splitting of the system into pieces must occur from the top-down considering the critical 
functions necessary for safety and reliability. Engineering managers must have a firm grasp of 
the risk drivers for their system, even if they are at very low levels of the WBS.  The engineering 
and management challenge then becomes the process of reintegrating the pieces into a cohesive 
system while avoiding adverse couplings and interactions that may affect safety and reliability.  
Simplified designs, models, and interface assumptions made early in the life cycle often turn out 
to be more complex when actual systems are produced and tested. The role of the systems 
engineer in integration requires the mindset of a "generalist" who can identify critical functional, 
physical interfaces, and interactions among tightly coupled system elements. Functional and 
physical interfaces must be kept simple so newly joined elements of the system that may 
adversely interact and compromise safety and reliability can be identified. 
Design teams responsible for individual system elements must be aware of their system’s 
sensitivities and unwanted interactions with other system elements to understand potential 
adverse coupling with other systems. It is important for the SE Team to recognize the importance 
of interaction among discipline engineers after requirements have been allocated and to capture 
cross-interface information in ICD.   
Controlling Implications of New Technology 
The mix of new and existing technologies in a design can add to complexity that affects safety 
and reliability. New technology can improve safety and reliability when carefully selected and 
applied though new technologies often bring with them “unknown unknowns” that may represent 
safety and reliability risks.  
In cases where new technologies are necessary, the systems engineer must help the design teams 
assess the maturity and identify potential interactions, along with additional constraints and 
uncertainty the new technology might introduce. Introducing new technologies may make the 
system more reliable at maturity, but failures during the maturation process may make the 
system less reliable when considered over the life of the program. The systems engineer must 
understand how new technology introduces unknowns into the program, and what can be done to 
combat them, for example incorporating additional margin, extra testing, alternative flight 
manifests and concepts of operations. 
Applying Heritage and COTS System Elements 
Using “Heritage” and COTS system elements are often utilized as a way to reduce risk.
However, COTS elements can introduce complexity and risk if they are not applied properly. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
65 of 133 
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
COTS products bring with them design constraints, predefined interfaces, and operational 
constraints that the receiving system must accommodate. COTS elements, especially those with a 
proven flight track record, can improve safety and reliability, but it is their proper application 
and accommodation in a new and different application that represents a challenge to the systems 
designer. For COTS and heritage components, the design focus shifts from having to define the 
component’s detailed requirements (as in newly developed items) to accommodating its 
constraints.
Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the engineering team to ensure that the benefits are realized 
and that unknowns are discovered before flight. The promise and advertised benefit of a new 
technology or COTS elements is often not realized in practice and should therefore be addressed 
from a risk perspective.  
2.3.2 Iterative System Design and Defining the Right Requirements
The iterative system design loop seeks to converge on a set of self-consistent requirements, 
conceptual design, and baseline operations concept.  All three of these together must then meet 
the project’s needs, objectives, and constraints. In fact, users need to participate in the overall 
SE effort to ensure unique needs are addressed in the overall system design.  Including the crew 
and Mission Operations Division in the early architecture design work is crucial, as they are the 
actual “users” of the system.  Figure 2.3-1 shows the early systems design flow described below. 
Iterative system design starts with the team’s understanding of the high-level project needs, 
objectives, and constraints as shown in the box on the left in Figure 2.3-1. These high-level 
needs, objectives, and constraints form the validation basis for the subsequent system design.  
Defining a simple set of mission objectives is described in Section 2.1.1.  Constraints include 
technical, cost, schedule, and risk limits used to define the walls of a constraint box shown in 
Figure 2.0-2.
High-level mission objectives are typically captured as “shall” requirement statements and 
often captured in the highest Level 1 requirements.  Mission objectives including destination, 
purpose, stay time, crew size, and support requirements often are a “shall” statement defining 
elements of the constraint “Box.” As described in Section 2.1.1, these mission objectives need to 
be as simple as possible as they form the basis for validation of the design work and ultimately 
drive the complexity of the system. 
It is critical that lower level derived requirements not be written too early.  “Shall” statements 
derived from the top-level requirements (mission needs, objectives, and constraints) should not 
be written before there is time and opportunity to iterate the design and operations concept along 
with the requirements.11  Once “shall” statements are written, it could appear that viable options 
inconsistent with the requirement statement are precluded. Shall statements written too early may 
11 Section 2.5 of the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook SP6105 stresses that “system requirements, and 
constraints should be left at a high level for as long as possible so that alternatives can be considered and 
uncertainties resolved before the most cost effective solution can be obtained.”
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unintentionally preclude other viable and safer solutions allowed by an alternate set of 
requirements.  The “right requirements” define the approaches that are consistent with the design 
and operations concept and have been validated against the mission needs, objectives, and 
constraints (especially cost).  These “right requirements” are best written after a few passes 
through the iterative system design loop. 
After establishing the mission objectives and constraints, it is important that the system 
designer identify the simplest set of functions necessary to meet the user’s needs shown in the 
next box in Figure 2.3-1.  Once the basic functions are identified, operational considerations and 
needs for each function are evaluated for each mission operational phase providing a detailed 
operational context for the subsequent design efforts. Each function’s criticality with respect to 
safety and mission success is identified. This distinction is critical for assessing and accepting a 
function’s criticality, appropriate fault tolerance, and probability of failure. 
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A key requirements driver is the understanding and estimation of the natural and induced 
environments based on the design and the operations concept.  The system designer must 
develop an understanding of the internal and external environment anticipated during system 
operation.  In addition, the designer must develop protective or mitigating features, to defend the 
system against normally anticipated excursions in these environments and abnormal excursions 
in proportion to their risk. The uncertainty in the environment seen by each element of the 
system drives the margin required to envelop uncertainty.  A significant amount of uncertainty 
can exist in the environment and how it is modeled.  To understand how system elements may 
react and operate in the estimated environment, it is important for system designers to perform 
sensitivity studies to understand if and where potential “cliffs” or ultimate limits exist in the 
system. 
The SE team must allocate technical resources such as mass, volume, power, fuel, etc., as 
necessary, to meet the needs of safety and mission success functions.  Allocation of scarce 
resources must consider the importance of the function they are supporting. When resources are 
constrained, they should be assigned first to safety and then to mission success functions. 
Therefore, it is critical that the systems team have an understanding of the functions and their 
criticality before allocating resources and proceeding with design. 
Physical implementation of the system must be considered to preclude spatial and physical 
interactions between elements that can lead to failure.  Co-location of redundant units can lead 
to common cause failures. Separating redundant systems, especially diverse systems, may be 
required to prevent common cause failures such as leaks from defeating the intended 
redundancy. Additional iterations may be necessary to address interaction of system elements at 
its interfaces with other system elements.   
Up-front design must consider how a system will be tested in order to accommodate functions 
necessary for verification. Design can influence the costs and effectiveness of testing and 
inspection that occur later in the process.  Aspects such as "design to test," and "design to 
inspect/maintain" concepts are important to initial system design. 
Many decisions are necessary to define a system’s conceptual design. Useful trade techniques 
and evaluation criteria are described in the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook SP6105 and 
other references, which will not be repeated here. This handbook is a valuable reference for the 
systems engineer.  
The following section describes an iterative design loop driven by risk assessments.  
2.3.3 Risk Based System Design Loop 
This report describes a “risk-based” methodology, shown in Figure 2.3-2, to drive a safe and 
reliable design.  Since the early conceptual design has a high degree of influence on the system’s 
safety and reliability, a top-down perspective for the entire vehicle and its mission is necessary. 
The system design, its complexity, and the nature of the interfaces among system elements as 
well as the intrinsic reliability of its component elements define system safety and reliability. 
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Risk-based design provides a methodology to consider risk early in the design when obviating 
and mitigating risk is relatively easy. 
Conceptual designs are driven by the functions necessary to meet mission objectives, the way the 
functions can fail, and how these failures can be obviated and mitigated.  Henry Petroski writes 
in his book titled “Things Small and Large, “Things that succeed teach us little beyond the fact 
that they have been successful; things that fail provide proof that the limits of design have been 
exceeded. Emulating success risks failure; studying failure increases our chances of success. The 
simple principle that is seldom explicitly stated is that the most successful designs are based on 
the best and most complete assumptions about failure.” The risk-based design loop therefore 
addresses how a design might fail and how resources can be used to obviate and mitigate risk. 
An integrated team representing the crew, mission operations, mission design, SE, subsystem 
domain teams, reliability, human factors, test, safety, and quality assurance are necessary to 
explore alternatives and select an optimal approach. It is through the participation of experienced 
team members that diverse ideas and potential solutions are considered and evaluated from a 
safety and reliability perspective.   
The starting point for the iterative design loop is the simplest possible configuration based on the 
functional block diagram. The team then utilizes the iterative loop to refine the system as 
necessary to adjust fault tolerance and redundancy as driven by risk. 
Figure 2.3-2 Iterative Risk Based System Design Loop 
Figure 2.3-2 shows the risk-based iterative loop assessing risk through the use of reliability 
analysis and is described below.  The iterative loop seeks to “make it work,” “make it safe and 
reliable,” and “make it affordable.”  
The team combines the operations concept, along with the characteristics of the design, 
considering both normal function and potential malfunctions and failures.  These are identified 
by a functional FMEA, fault tree analysis, and the physics of the situation including hazards and 
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the time to respond to failures as inputs to an Integrating Risk Analysis as shown in the left hand 
boxes in Figure 2.3-2. 
Next, an Integrating Risk Analysis is used to identify the risk drivers shown as the middle box in 
Figure 2.3-2. An ESD is used as an example in this report for the integrating element. ESDs can 
be used to integrate driving characteristics of the operations concept, design, and its failure 
modes, physics of the situation, and reliability analysis to identify the risk drivers for the solution 
under consideration.  The ESD provides a method for both a time ordering (“sequence”) along 
the horizontal axis and a functional relationship along the vertical axis.  In this manner, the ESD 
serves as a powerful technique to assess successful and failure events.
Other integrating elements or diagrams can be used, such as functional flow diagrams or fault 
trees for each major functional or operational configuration.  However, careful consideration 
must be given to include and capture the operational sequence and operations concept with these 
techniques.
The Integrating Risk analysis: 
x Considers nominal Mission Sequence of Events or Operations Concept for accomplishing 
the mission and allows evaluation of failure scenarios. 
x Identifies necessary functions and a conceptual design 
x Identifies failure modes of functions and external hazards 
x Estimates likelihood of failures and their consequences 
x Identifies system passive/active response to likely failure modes 
x Based on the response of the system, identifies risk drivers.  Make note of how much risk 
is “set aside” because it falls into “unlikely, assumptions, or sensitivities;” if what gets set 
aside gets too big, then revisit the drivers and include some of the ‘unlikely’ in this 
analysis. 
The next step shown in the right hand boxes in Figure 2.3-2 takes the resulting risk drivers and 
iterates the design, operations concept, and derived requirements as necessary to either obviate or 
mitigate the risks. The optimum approach is to eliminate the risk by altering the design or 
operations concept if possible.  Approaches to mitigate risks included using existing system 
elements in alternate ways, addition of redundancy or other diverse functional backups, as well 
as designing for a highly reliable design for minimum risk. 
Each iteration cycle considers an alternative. Alternatives should be plotted as a surface within 
the constraint box shown in Figure 2.0-2. The ultimate solution is then chosen from the family of 
alternatives considered. Alternatives considered, but not chosen, are also important in shaping 
and defining the ultimate solution and providing the justification and rational for the solution. 
As an example, Figure 2.3-4 shows the progression of alternatives considered during the 
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) launcher study.  Figure 2.3-5 shows how 
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uncertainty estimates are useful in determining the significance of the differences between 
alternatives. 
Below is one path applicable to the upfront work in the life cycle that can lead to a safe, reliable 
and affordable design.
Step 1 Define needs, objectives, and constraints in clear and simple terms, and then capture 
them as the high-level requirements. These form the validation basis for the subsequent 
work. The constraints can be visualized as the boundaries of a box as shown in Figure 
2.0-2. Subsequent steps seek to find solutions within box constraint boundaries and select 
one for production. Alternatives should be plotted against constraints forming a “surface” 
from which a solution is selected. 
Step 2 Define the minimum set of functions necessary to accomplish the mission objectives. 
x Identify and describe the functions the system must perform from a systematic top-
down perspective in order to fulfill mission needs and objectives. 
x Clearly identify and distinguish functions necessary for safety and mission success. 
This distinction is critical for assessing and accepting a function’s criticality, 
appropriate fault tolerance, and probability of failure. 
x The identified critical functions should be used to set up the PBS (the source for a 
product structured WBS) in a manner that prevents unnecessary splitting of safety 
critical functions that would complicate interface control and team understanding of 
adverse couplings. 
x Defining the necessary functions allows a clear understanding or statement of the 
problem to help guide and define appropriate solutions. Often a solution becomes 
evident after a clear statement of the problem. 
Step 3 Make it work. Create the simplest conceptual design of the contemplated system.  
x Start with the simplest, most robust, and highest performance design option as the 
primary leg for accomplishing the mission functions identified above with inherent 
safety. The primary leg also forms the first leg when assessing fault tolerance. The 
simplest solution should lie within the constraint box boundaries with adequate 
margin for the succeeding steps below.  
x If the simplest solution falls outside of the constraint box, then there may not be a 
workable solution; start the process over again with an alternate set of needs, 
objectives, and constraints. 
x If the solution falls inside the constraint box but is not viewed as viable or optimum, 
consider alternatives with different operational concepts, designs, or derived 
requirements as depicted in the iterative loop shown in Figure i-4. 
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Step 4 Make it safe. Add diverse or independent elements to the simple system of step 3 that 
operates at lower or even marginal performance but with higher reliability as necessary to 
meet safety needs. This additional leg adds to system fault tolerance, although it may be 
applied as the last leg not necessarily the second leg.  A simple diverse system maximizes 
the independence from prime system faults and should be easier to understand and verify. 
x Evaluate the conceptual design and operations concept to determine potential failure 
modes and safety impacts. Initially the evaluation must be performed from the top-
down starting from the mission level and consider each operational phase or 
operational system configuration of the mission. Utilize Functional FMEAs (based on 
functions) and /or fault tree analysis (top-down based on undesired consequences) 
along with an integrating technique such as ESDs to identify risk drivers.
x Utilize risk and reliability modeling techniques to bound the likelihood of the 
identified safety drivers. Discussions and debates resulting from likelihood and 
consequence discussions are helpful for further understanding and exploring the risk 
drivers.
x Pay particular attention to common cause failures that may defeat the intended safety 
improvements of the additional elements. 
x Iterate the candidate mission rules and procedures to safely achieve the minimum 
acceptable objective.  
x Provide an abort mode for those phases of the mission where the likelihood or 
consequence of safety critical initiating events or consequences cannot be contained. 
x An effective methodology is to start with the “end game” of returning the crew to 
Earth and continue to work backwards from re-entry to launch assuring that safety 
and reliability are preserved during each operational phase of the mission. In other 
words, utilize technical resources such as, mass, volume, power, etc., to get the crew 
home first. 
x If the solution is not safe, consider alternatives with different operational concepts, 
designs, or derived requirements as depicted in the iterative loop shown in Figure i-4. 
Step 5 Make it reliable. Consider additional elements or other “legs,” preferentially an 
additional primary leg of equivalent performance but not necessarily identical design for 
mission success. Additional legs for mission continuance add to system fault tolerance.  
Determine if the addition of the mission success leg leads to a safer system by 
considering all the potential dependencies.
x Utilize risk and reliability modeling techniques to estimate the effects of one 
alternative over another. If an alternative reduces overall risk and is affordable, add it; 
if not, be sure that the implications of accepting this risk are understood. Again, 
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discussions and debates resulting from likelihood and consequence discussions are 
helpful for further understanding and exploring the risk drivers. 
x Pay particular attention to common cause failures that may defeat the intended safety 
and reliability improvements of additional elements. Strive for designs that will limit 
the occurrence or consequence of common cause failures. 
x Consider the maturity and complexity of the system when addressing how to mitigate 
unknown unknowns. This may drive additional features to facilitate testing and 
verification needs, for example additional test points or data recorders. 
x If the solution is not reliable, consider alternatives with different operational 
concepts, designs, or derived requirements, as depicted in the iterative loop shown in 
Figure i-4. 
Step 6 Make it Affordable.  Estimate cost and schedule to develop, produce, and operate the 
system design of steps 2 through 4.   
x Upfront design work has a high degree of leverage on the system’s cost since these 
early activities expend around 10 to 15 percent of the project cost yet commit in 
excess of 50 percent of the total run out costs. 
x Iterate the operations concept, design, or derived requirements as necessary to satisfy 
constraints, go back through steps 2, 3, 4, and/or 5, as necessary. 
Step 7 Capture the Conceptual Design.  
x Capture the decisions of steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 as the derived requirements, baseline 
operations concept, and baseline conceptual design.
x Consider all the legs of the system design when assessing system fault tolerance 
utilizing the rationale developed in the above steps to justify any differences between 
the selected approach and the starting point of two fault tolerance. 
x Capture the allocation and utilization of technical resources along with the rationale 
for the allocations. (mass, volume, power, fuel, etc) 
x Develop a program plan that tentatively defines prioritized requirements for each 
system element in the PBS, allocates physical and resource constraints to each, 
describes a system acquisition strategy, and assigns management responsibility for 
each effort.  At the completion of this step, a safe and reliable system, producible at 
minimum cost, schedule, and complexity has been identified. 
The previous steps describe a methodology for developing a design that can meet the needs and 
operational requirements through an iterative loop until performance, cost/schedule, and risk 
constraints are met. Even though the process is described in a step-by-step fashion, aspects of 
performance, safety and reliability, and affordability are not independent quantities and should 
not be considered independently in the process of design.  While safety is of paramount 
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importance, the implied order or hierarchy to the design process obligates the designer to make 
the design work first, make it safe and reliable, and then assure it is affordable.  This is because 
affordability is moot if the design will not achieve a reasonable level of safety and reliability; 
safety and reliability are moot if the design does not function. 
Utilizing this iterative loop described above and shown in Figure 2.3-2 provides affirmative 
rationale for the system design, its complexity, and the existence of each system element. This 
approach may lessen the likelihood of having to lop off pieces of a design to get it back “in the 
box.” Lopping invariably leaves the system in a less cohesive state, vulnerable to unexpected 
interactions and other shortfalls. 
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Figure 2.3-4 ESAS Variation of Mission Architectures with LOC Risk12
12 NASA’s Exploration Systems Architectural Study, Chapter 8 Risk and Reliability, Final Report, TM-2005-
214062 November 2005 
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Figure 2.3-5 ESAS Probability of LOC Variation with CLV LEO Configuration 13
2.3.4 System Redundancy Design Guidance or Rules of Thumb 
Here are some rules of thumb for making risk trades for systems.  These should not be 
considered “rules” as they are broken often.  They should be considered as areas of concern and 
guidelines when considering alternatives, making design decisions, and when listening to 
arguments. 
1.  Simple is better than complex. 
2.  Passive is better than active. 
3.  Active two state devices are better than continually acting devices, e.g., boundary valves that 
just open and close are better than control valves that have to move to and hold a commanded 
position.
4.  Passive devices are better when subjected to well-understood load spectra, than when 
subjected to unknown or uncertain loads. 
13 NASA’s Exploration Systems Architectural Study, Chapter 8, Risk and Reliability, Final Report, TM-2005-
214062 November 2005 
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5.  Continually acting devices that move over a range either, linear or rotational, such as valves, 
are better than continually rotating devices such as pumps and turbines.  In the latter case, 
lower rotational speed is preferred over higher. 
6.  Electrical circuits should only be given the bandwidth necessary to perform the desired 
function to limit the potential adverse and cascading effects of glitches, transients, Single 
Event Effects, etc.  This is especially important with the advancement of high speed, low 
voltage, and low power CMOS integrated circuit, ASIC, and FPGA technologies that are 
becoming more sensitive to low levels of noise. This principle is important for devices or 
functions that are ultimately activated by pulses such as pyros, thruster valves, separation 
systems, deployment systems, reset signals, electrical switches, etc. 
7.  When safety enhancement of a simple system is required, robustness is preferred over 
diversity, and diversity is preferred over duplicative redundancy.  This depends on the types 
of unknowns being protected against.  This can be related to the concept of simple (simple 
systems may operate in complex environments).  Robustness is always limited by 
understanding of the loads and materials.  In some cases, defense in depth (diversity) better 
protects against unanticipated failures and failure modes, but both provide a measure of 
protection that duplicative redundancy does not.  This is especially good if the diversity 
emanates from a required function (i.e., RCS back-up for main engine burns). 
8.  When identical unit redundancy is employed, there is always “coverage” or “common cause” 
or “correlated failure” factors to be considered that diminishes the theoretical benefit 
provided by this type of redundancy.  This coverage is non-linear as more units are added, so 
that at some point the addition of another unit is counterproductive.  In addition, the coverage 
effect is non-linear with the reliability of the individual unit.  As the individual units become 
more reliable, the unreliability in the interconnections overwhelms the benefit of adding 
units.
9. For fast acting or “pulsed” service, such as is the case for combustion injection, solenoid 
valves or equivalent are to be preferred.  For slower acting or boundary, that is leakage 
prevention or isolation service, motor operated valves are preferred. 
2.3.5 Lessons from the real world14:
• Objectives and constraints are sacred.  Therefore, they must be selected with care. 
• Requirements, like ICDs, are tools used to ensure coordination and the accomplishment of 
objectives.  Unlike objectives, they may be adjusted as required to achieve the objective 
within constraints.  Each requirement has a direct and indirect cost.  Accordingly, the total 
cost of satisfying each requirement must be individually weighed against its contribution to 
meeting the objective.  Once accepted in step 5, requirements may be eliminated but 
14 Assembled for this report by TK Mattingly  
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experience shows such action seldom recovers schedule and may even increase cost.  
Therefore, requirements must be grudgingly accepted in step 5.
• The design and operational concepts must be jointly developed and set the minimum cost and 
schedule.  Therefore, the engineers and operators are the only ones who can ensure the 
achievement of program objectives within constraints. 
• The most egregious flaws in program estimates result from errors of omission. 
• The iterations performed during steps 2 through 6 are most effective when conducted by 
relatively small co-located teams of personnel who will be responsible for execution.   
• The design of integrated space systems is so complex that very few design principles can be 
applied without careful consideration on a case-by-case basis.   
• Design and operational choices in human spaceflight must treat the consequences of 
component failure as more important than the probability of success.   
• Use of heritage designs can be cost effective but require the same level of detail understanding 
as demanded of new designs.   
• History must be considered but only to the degree it is directly applicable to the extant 
situation.  There is a real danger that blind acceptance of yesterday’s lessons will be 
inappropriate if the time between the lesson learned and the application to a new design is 
significant.  For example, during development of the STS, the astronaut office insisted that 
critical displays and controls be implemented as conventional electro-mechanical designs due 
to the history of frequent failures in new electronic interfaces.  By the time the Shuttle flew, 
electronic D&C had matured to the point that their MTBF was vastly superior to those 
demonstrated by the highest quality electro-mechanical devices.  In fact, a major upgrade to 
the Shuttle was its incorporation of a glass cockpit, a capability that could have been built in 
from the beginning.   
• PRA techniques are useful in evaluating relative merits of alternate design implementations 
but cannot be relied upon to predict actual reliability.  This is especially true for devices with 
a relatively small population.    
• As the design matures, one should expect to see an increase in weight, complexity and cost. 
• The complexity and uniqueness of individual spacecraft designs require that special care be 
taken in accepting lessons learned on “similar” designs and applications without verifying the 
assumptions, purpose and basis for the presentation of results.
• Few real programs have the luxury of thoroughly completing the front end work, steps 1 and 
2, before moving into step 7 and program implementation.   
• There is usually more than one system implementation that will satisfy the minimum set of 
functional requirements.  Among those that provide adequate performance, the selection 
should be based on optimizing other program objectives such as fault tolerance, ability to 
gracefully accommodate uncertainty, operational simplicity, cost or schedule.  For example, 
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STS selected the aerodynamic FCS that provided adequate controllability with the greatest 
tolerance for aerodynamic uncertainties.   
2.4 Implementing the System Right, Achieving a Safe and Reliable System
After the architecture is defined and the requirements are documented, the selected concept must 
be matured into hardware, software, logistics, etc., through the “Preliminary and Detailed 
Design,” “Manufacturing and Assembly,” “System Integration and Verification,” and 
“Operations” processes shown as the major blocks in Figure i-1.  These activities, which are 
performed throughout the life cycle, are based on well-established practices.  Practices captured 
in established NASA and military standards will not be repeated in this report. The following 
sections will describe activities and practices focused towards implementing a reliable system 
and screening for potential problems. 
Behind the life cycle activities are processes that form a multilayered approach for developing a 
safe and reliable system as shown in Figure i-1.  Teams should view the processes of design, 
manufacturing, independent review, inspection, and test as multilayered activities assuring the 
implementation of a safe and reliable system.   
Proper implementation of proven practices and processes in all the layers greatly improves the 
likelihood of success. The virtual series of nets (Figure 2.4-1) seek to prevent a potential hazard 
from resulting in a failure or a mishap thereby ensuring the system works and is safe and reliable.  
Each layer provides the opportunity for developers to identify differences between the designers’ 
intent and reality allowing corrective action before the system is implemented, thus precluding 
failures. Thoroughness and strength of the layers depend on critical characteristics of team 
members (poles in graphic).  Each layer within the multilayered approach provides a mechanism 
for identifying (bracketed items in the graphic) and collecting off-nominal conditions, warning 
signs, and precursors to failure. Conditions that could result in significant risks should be input 
and integrated into the risk management process as described in Section 2.5. 
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Figure 2.4-1 Multilayered Approach to Produce a Safe/Reliable System and Screen for 
Hazards (Adapted from James Reason15)
x Dense and diverse nets with solid supporting poles serve as barriers, or screens, preventing hazards 
from causing accidents or mishaps 
x Multiple imperfections in the nets, or supporting poles, may allow hazards to result in accidents or 
mishaps
x Avoid inducing hazards or latent failures into sensitive system elements by processing steps 
The challenge for the development team is to produce and operate a system in a manner that 
maximizes the chance of choosing the right solution and uncovering problems before they cause 
significant adverse consequences. Given finite resources, it is the designers’ challenge to 
commit technical, cost, and schedule resources in a way to achieve a desired level of reliability.
Strengthening weak layers, through proper implementation of design choices, can be viewed as 
investments in improving reliability by decreasing the likelihood of flaws and increasing the 
15 Reason, J. (1990) Human Error. Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge 
 Reason, J. (1997) Managing the Risk of Organizational Accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
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likelihood of detection.  With judicious investments, the probability of failure can be made 
extremely remote.  
To do this, the designer must be aware of the types of flaws that can occur, processes that 
introduce flaws, and ability of the different layers to prevent failure.  When the source and 
character of flaws are understood, then targeted barriers can be used to detect and prevent 
potential failures.  Conversely, uncertainty in the characterization of flaws leads to the need for 
more diverse flaw detection methods.  
The thoroughness and strength of the layers depend on critical characteristics of team members.  
As in Figure 2.4-2, these characteristics are shown as poles that support the nets.  As described in 
Section 2.1.4, it takes experience to produce a reliable system and curiosity, skepticism, and 
imagination to foresee what might go wrong, and then act proactively.   
No single layer can assure reliability by itself.  Producing a reliable system requires the proper 
application of process at each layer.  By the same token, no individual layer should be 
compromised based on the assumption or hope that another layer will compensate for 
deficiencies of another layer. 
The following sections will describe each of the design, manufacturing (fabrication), 
independent review, inspection, test, and operation layers.  How each layer helps to identify 
potential system weaknesses and contributes a safe and reliable system is described. 
2.4.1  Design 
Designing a system that meets all requirements within mission constraints is an exceptionally 
difficult process requiring experience and skill.  Like the architecting process before it, the 
design process also utilizes an iterative approach to achieve an optimum result.  Results of the 
previous phase, including baseline architecture, operations concept, and system requirements are 
the initial inputs.  Candidate designs are proposed and assessed to examine whether mission level 
requirements are met within program constraints of cost, schedule, performance, and risk (refer 
to Figure 2.4.2).  This is accomplished by flowing mission-level requirements down to lower 
levels of the design, elements, subsystems, components, even parts and, concurrently, into 
disciplines. Each requirement described should be necessary, stated unambiguously, and 
verifiable.
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Figure 2.4.2 Candidate Design and Assessment Iterative Detailed Design Loop 
To achieve a reliable design, the iterative flow, shown above, should utilize risk-based evaluation 
criteria to identify risks to safety and mission success requirements.  To meet requirements, 
alternatives are considered and decisions are made as to whether to change the design, suggest 
alternate requirements, or change the operations concept.  Reliability analysis helps identify 
design weak points and identify alternatives. By applying a risk-based approach as discussed in 
Section 2.3, designers carefully examine where resources should be expended to refine 
spacecraft designs to meet safety and mission success requirements.  Reliability analyses are an 
important part of this process, designing fault avoidance and tolerance into the system from the 
“ground up.” 
Reliability analyses are used to ensure implementation approaches are sound and consistent with 
project requirements and the intent of the architecture.  Refer to Section 3.0 for details. Results 
from reliability analyses may drive design considerations to reduce failure likelihood, mitigate 
risk, increase margins, or implement contingency plans.  Special steps are often documented in 
the Critical Items Lists or the Hazard Control portion of Hazard Reports to assure the system 
element is designed and produced with the requisite attention to detail. 
Some important considerations in developing reliable designs are listed below. 
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x Design must be testable, manufacture-able, and operable.  Specialists from these disciplines 
should be involved as early as possible. 
x The entire operational life cycle should be considered, including flight and ground operations, 
maintenance, and refurbishment, if applicable. 
x Knowledge of a system’s sensitivities along with uncertainties in environments and system 
parameters forms the basis for defining margins. System sensitivities should be assessed and 
should be minimized where possible. 
x Margins should be included that are sufficient to cover the entire range of possible inputs (such 
as environments).  A method of including robustness is to set requirements over expected 
levels (expected + margin). 
x System designers need to recognize that heritage designs or COTS products do only what its 
initial builders intended, not necessarily exactly what is needed in the new application.  Use of 
heritage hardware (qualified by similarity) should be applied with caution.  Often, it takes only 
a small deviation from a previous design or application to produce vastly different behavior. 
"Generally throughout the agency, heritage hardware (and software) are given less scrutiny 
than new hardware because of an often unfounded faith that heritage designs are qualified and 
will perform properly in a new application."16
x The reuse of existing designs, heritage elements, and COTS hardware and software should 
undergo extensive scrutiny to verify that the item meets all requirements for the given 
application. Great care must be taken to assure that the previous work applies to the mission at 
hand.
x Utilization of existing designs, heritage elements, and COTS hardware and software requires 
the consideration and accommodation of its interfaces and constraints potentially driving other 
aspects of the system.  Reusing existing designs means accepting the way the product works 
and the way it interfaces and interacts with the rest of the system.  Designers may need to 
adjust the system to accommodate the constraints of the reused elements. 
x Beware of the domino effect where fault tolerant architecture is not a preventative or solution
to a system design configured using low reliability components (heritage or COTS selection 
based often rationalized on low cost). 
x Consider potential spatial interactions and identify where spatial separation is necessary to 
provide the intended fault tolerance.  Physical placement can subject components to coincident 
hazards (e.g., thermal, vibration) or common cause failures that can cut through barriers 
intended and built into the design. 
x Crewed vehicles are often designed to have portions reused from flight to flight.  Plans for 
refurbishment should be considered at the outset of a design and refined over time as the 
16 Genesis: Mishap Investigation Board Report, Volume I, November 30, 2005. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
85 of 133 
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
program progresses.  Once returned for refurbishment, hardware should be thoroughly 
inspected, to predetermined criteria, for nominal or off-nominal issues warranting further 
investigation for insertion into the risk assessment/corrective action process.  Hardware 
discrepancies uncovered during this process should never be ignored. 
Design Verification and Validation through Analysis, Modeling, and Simulation 
Early in development, a verification matrix is generated to identify the method demonstrating 
how each requirement will be verified.  Modeling, simulation, and analysis are frequently used 
during design to not only verify and validate a design but also to approximate the system’s 
performance and predict its ability to withstand operational environments.  Analysis is frequently 
used to verify parameters that are outside the ability to verify by test.  It is important to use 
correlated models and simulations to estimate real-world behavior. Analyses and models not 
validated to real-world results or correlated to physics could introduce risk by under or over 
estimating real-world effects. Designers should plan development testing as early as possible to 
verify both models and simulations.  Other verification methods, tests, and inspections, will be 
discussed in subsequent sections. 
Design’s Technical Integration
As shown in Figure 2.4-2, subsystem teams need to integrate their elements, and understand how 
they influence other subsystems and how they are influenced by other subsystems.  It is 
important for the SE team to recognize the importance of fostering interaction among discipline 
engineers after requirements have been allocated.  Extensive communication among the teams 
developing the design pieces is essential to achieving a balanced design. Both formal and 
informal communication is required.  Teams should be aware of unwanted interactions among 
subsystem elements and consider the potential effects of hardware and software anomalies. 
Interfaces must be considered during this process by relevant cross-interface information 
contained in an ICD.
The interactions and influences among systems are important as engineers perform detailed 
design trades at their level until designated requirements (performance, environmental, etc.) are 
met.  Resultant design pieces must then be re-evolved into a system-level design and reevaluated 
against system requirements.  At the system level, adverse interactions will be found that could 
not be anticipated until detailed designs were developed at lower levels.  Accounting for, or 
making adjustments to, these adverse interactions early in the process enables the item being 
developed to function properly at the system level; assuring a successful system design.  
Another important aspect of technical integration is the revalidation of the design as it matures.  
The early systems analysis activities described in Section 2.3 rely on simplifying assumptions, 
linear modeling, and simple interfaces.  As the design matures and discipline experts proceed 
with their detailed design, the physical non-linear realities start to surface and may add 
complexity and unintentional interactions.  SE needs to revalidate the system design, 
compatibility of interfaces and total integrated system performance as the design matures.  A 
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thorough discussion of this process and considerations for integrating various subsystems into a 
cohesive system is found in NASA TP-2001-210992. 
Assessing Compliance
After design iterations and analysis are complete, some parts of a design may not meet their 
requirements due to various other constraining factors influencing the overall design.  In these 
cases, design waivers or deviations may be necessary to resolve the noncompliances.  In cases 
where waivers or deviations increase safety or mission success risk, these items need to be input 
to the risk management process for total project risk assessment as discussed in Section 2.5. 
2.4.2 Manufacturing, Assembly, and Integration  
Spacecraft and component manufacturing occurs at a number of geographically diverse sites, 
including NASA, prime contractor, subcontractor, and manufacturer facilities.  This large base of 
suppliers alone provides the rationale for why proven manufacturing techniques should be 
consistently applied to all system elements.  No supplier should unknowingly introduce a weak 
link into the total system.  Manufacturers need to meet certain standards to produce reliable 
hardware.  Projects seeking to produce reliable hardware need to establish manufacturing, 
workmanship, and inspection standards to ensure consistent quality and reliability of their system 
elements.  Process controls should be instituted such that personnel are trained to implement the 
process, understand deficiencies when they arise, correct those deficiencies, and retrain the 
modified process.
International process guidelines like ISO 9000 help with methodologies for implementing this 
approach, but do not define the actual manufacturing processes ensuring consistent quality 
among all suppliers.  ISO 9000 is only a portion of quality control for a successful manufacturing 
process.  Equal care must be exercised in process development and implementation.   
The use of heritage hardware and COTS products presents unique challenges for reliable 
systems. COTS suppliers offer limited visibility into how their products are produced. Gaining 
insight into COTS elements may be necessary if they are used in mission critical applications. 
Even reputable COTS vendors can produce products that have defects. COTS vendors are not 
generally constrained to maintain the same design, production process, material, or components 
over time; only to produce a product that meets the unit level specifications.  There is the 
potential for significant lot-to-lot variability.  Care must be taken to ensure the unit flown or used 
in support of flight is the same as the one inspected or tested.  Teams need to identify those items 
that warrant additional insight and implement additional controls, as necessary, to assure safety 
and reliability. 
An environment of freedom to report problems without fear of reprisal, where safety and mission 
success is the primary goal, is essential.  If, during the course of manufacture, an item is 
discovered not to meet drawing or process requirements, a flag should be raised.  In response to 
the flag, the team must choose the appropriate resolution and disposition considering safety and 
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mission success. If waivers, deviations, or Material Review Boards (MRB) are processed, they 
should only be approved after a complete assessment demonstrating acceptability from a risk 
perspective.  Waivers should be viewed as a last resort, not as a routine practice to save cost and 
schedule.  See Section 2.5 for discussions on integrating risks and Section 12.0 for more 
information on the Materials and Processes aspects of manufacturing. 
Fabrication includes both construction of early prototypes used for development testing and the 
building and integration of the flight article.  It should be noted that prototypes are not always 
built to the same level of detail or quality as flight hardware; therefore care should be exercised 
that they replicate component equipment and performance as closely as possible.  This is 
particularly important where the intent is to retire flight article risks.  A qualification article, if 
used, must be built to the same standards as flight hardware.  Liberal use of these early 
pathfinders, especially for new technology, as a method of uncovering design flaws while they 
are still relatively inexpensive to correct is highly encouraged. 
Software is becoming increasingly important in the successful functioning of space systems.  As 
reliance on software for critical functions grows, so does its contribution to mission failures. 
Flight software is developed iteratively and in pieces, similarly to flight hardware.  Configuration 
control, to track changes and versions, as well as ensure they do not detrimentally affect other 
part of the system is important, as is verification that is becoming increasingly difficult. See 
Section 6.0 for detailed discussions about Software. 
Integration is the point in the systems development process where all of the elements of the 
system come together.  Portions of the system may have been build in various and sometimes 
remote locations, in some cases elsewhere in the world, before they are delivered to the 
integration site and before they are combined into a single complex functioning system. 
Unexpected occurrences often arise, where pieces of the system do not work together as they 
should, either mechanically or electrically.  No integration anomaly should be left unaddressed.
Proximate and root cause for each problem should be found, risks identified and fully 
understood, and corrective action determined. 
2.4.3 Independent Review  
Independent review along the development and operations life cycle provides a critical layer in 
producing a reliable system. Reviews allow the access to knowledge and experience from outside 
the development group. Independent peers can identify issues or suggest alternatives that may 
not be known to the developers. As discussed below, engineering peer reviews can provide 
valuable input to the development team to make unknowns known. 
Independent means review team leaders and team members who are not in the direct chain of 
command or the program or project.
A review is an evaluation of the system elements by a knowledgeable group, independent of the 
project or element under review, for the purposes listed below. 
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x Identifying potential problems, unexpected interactions, and/or risks and recommending 
improvements and corrective actions 
x Timely identification of deficiencies that will allow the Project to take appropriate and 
efficient corrective actions  
x Validation of the adequacy of assumptions, trade-offs explored, and design solution 
proposed
x Assessing the status of and progress toward accomplishing the planned activities 
x Making judgments on the activity’s readiness for the follow-on events 
Reviews are conducted consistent with maturity as defined by life cycle phase and expectations 
established by review success criteria.   
Space system acquisitions utilize a series of formal program reviews (System Requirement 
Review, PDR, Critical Design Review, etc.) as milestones at which the Project is expected to 
have achieved a prescribed level of accomplishment.  The NASA Systems Engineering 
Handbook SP-6105 and others such as MIL-STD-1521B, describe these reviews in detail.  While 
these reviews are valuable in providing a point at which the Program can be thoroughly assessed 
(often forcing self-assessment), they are frequently misused.  To have validity, the reviews must 
be gates through which the Project is not permitted to pass without the required progress toward 
a low-risk design.  However, cost and schedule pressures have often resulted in continuation 
through these gates prematurely, ironically increasing risk rather than reducing it.  In addition, 
issues raised by reviewers on formal Review Item Discrepancy (RID) forms in some cases have 
been ignored precluding early resolution to impending problems. 
Timely closure, RIDs, Requests for Actions (RFAs), and Action Items submitted at a review are 
critical to risk reduction. The review process provides these instruments in an attempt to 
document risks.  Some RIDs or RFAs that remain open or may not be closed and agreed to by 
the initiator could represent risk to the project. These open or unresolved items need to be input 
to the risk management process for further assessment. 
Among the most value added reviews are engineering peer reviews (EPR) that are convened 
when an in-depth penetration by independent subject matter experts (center personnel and non-
center personnel) is needed to scrutinize details of the element under review.   Large formal 
reviews provide some of the benefits of EPRs but primarily provide insight at a higher level 
where delving into details is difficult. Higher-level reviews typically look into the project status 
and issues being worked in a comprehensive framework at measured milestones. 
Organizations define the EPR standards and guidelines that apply to the EPRs they conduct in 
support of flight projects, both for work completed in-house and at contractor sites.  Review 
benefits depend strongly on the quality of the reviewers and follow-through on identified issues, 
concerns, and recommendations.  Planned contractor participation in NASA reviews and NASA 
participation in review of contractor-provided product(s) must be documented in the Project 
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Review Plan and made known to contractors in procurement documents prior to contract 
negotiation.
2.4.3.1 High Value EPRs: 
1. EPRs need strong experienced leaders, broad systems people, as well as detailed 
specialists, for each review.  Level and experience of peer reviewers is inversely 
proportional to the experience of the designer.
2. EPRs need to be properly planned and scheduled to lead up to more formal reviews.  
There can be hundreds of peer reviews on a mission.  
3. Peer reviews are the only place where the detailed drawings and detailed analyses that 
supports the design can be discussed.
4. It is important for designers to discuss functional/operational behavior, not just how the 
design meets requirements.  The process of discussing expected performance provides 
opportunities for insight and unexpected information and can fill gaps in requirements or 
designer’s experience (e.g., including the right filtering in noisy input circuits). 
5. Use of heritage hardware and software should undergo a “Heritage Review” to assure 
that assumptions, environments, and operational sequences allow the product to fulfill its 
intended need in the new application.  Ensuring existing, inherited, and COTS designs 
require the same rigor in peer review as new designs.  Making assumptions about 
inheritance that bypasses the peer review process can lead to serious problems later.   
6. Peer review allows some level of penetration of culturally/experience-based approaches 
that could be blind to a new environment.  Examples: 1) flawed assumptions can be made 
about implementing fault protection for systems in near-constant communications with 
the ground versus those with time delay or significant periods/events requiring autonomy; 
and 2) Cassini Huygens probe radio design did not have the right Doppler shift included. 
7. Ground support equipment (GSE) interfaces to flight systems need a thorough peer 
review, including failure modes and effects (e.g., Deep Impact failed to detect a GSE 
design flaw where the failure of a GSE switch would cause the failure of a flight power 
switch).
8. Peer review allows communication about known areas where problems can/have 
occurred in the past that may change with technology, e.g., asynchronous versus 
synchronous gate array designs. 
9. Peer review should be applied to test planning and results to ensure verification and 
validation process catches anything that the peer review process misses. 
10. Incorporation of diverse design teams from multiple NASA centers provides alternate 
perspectives of design elements and challenge group think. 
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2.4.4 Inspection and Walkdown 
The inspection and walkdown layer encourages teams to look at the product incrementally as it is 
produced as well as when it is assembled in its final state. Requirements, drawings, and 
processes intend to prescribe how a product should be built.  To assure that the product was 
actually produced properly per the paper and designer’s intent requires teams to look at the 
product, measure it, and verify that it was built with the intended quality. 
Inspection is generally used to assess the satisfaction of quality control requirements.  Valuable 
information on a product can be gained from inspection alone.  Inspection should not, however, 
be used to verify complex functional or environmental performance.  System reliability requires 
proper operation over time, and the time aspect cannot be inspected. As such, quality control 
inspection is necessary but not sufficient for ensuring reliability. 
Inspection is a verification method of examining the product itself, using visual means or 
measurements requiring precision measurement equipment.  Inspections can be performed by 
independent “Quality Inspectors” or by engineers familiar with the design depending on the 
purpose of the inspection. Walkdowns are performed by teams to ensure the product was 
produced as intended.
Certain components with safety and mission critical functions may require special in-process 
inspection points to assure their quality. These critical inspection points should be planned and 
inserted into the process. Sometimes it is necessary for design engineers and/or the users, such as 
the crew, to look at the system. Often inspection points are required by established 
manufacturing standards. Special inspection points may also be identified in reliability analyses, 
failure retention rationale such as those documented in the critical items list (CIL), Hazard 
Report Controls, or risk mitigation plans. 
It is critical for inspectors to have the appropriate experience and training. It requires significant 
experience and/or training to understand what is critical for reliability and know what types of 
things to look for. 
Once a discrepancy or issue is identified through the inspection process, teams need to decide 
how to resolve the issue.  Discrepancies can serve as warning signs or precursors to failure. 
Often issues are corrected. When discrepancies cannot be corrected or made compliant, then 
teams may take on risk. Inspection discrepancies or MRB actions with safety or mission success 
impacts may represent risk and should be input to the risk management process.  
2.4.5 Product Verification and Validation, “Test Like You Fly” 
After years of work and thousands of pragmatic compromises, the system that is to be flown will 
inevitably be different from that envisioned in many subtle ways.  As the hardware and software 
coalesce, the opportunity to make system changes essentially vanishes, although the mission 
objective remains unchanged.  At this point, program emphasis shifts from ensuring that the 
elements have been produced per specification to assuring that the system’s functional 
capabilities and limitations are thoroughly understood and accommodated by the flight plan.
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Testing provides the most effective method of proving that the system behaves as it must 
according to requirements (verification) and as it should according to the user needs (validation). 
Testing represents a critical layer in the multilayered approach for assuring a safe and reliable 
system.  The axiom is “Test like you fly; fly like you test.”  Tests should replicate actual 
conditions to the maximum extent possible, including hardware, software, environments, 
interfaces, and operational sequences.  Testing provides the opportunity to validate assumptions 
used during design and can uncover unexpected interaction among system elements and the 
users.  Tests go beyond compliance to requirements and can demonstrate that the system 
accomplishes its intended purpose through mission simulations, end-to-end tests, and joint 
integrated simulations. 
End-to-end system functional testing has historically been the technique of choice in satisfying 
the need to characterize the as-built system capabilities.  During Apollo, this was accomplished 
through full duration thermal-vacuum testing of prototype spacecraft with crews executing near 
real-time mission profiles (except re-entry).  This activity instilled high confidence at great cost, 
but the state-of–the-art simply could not support any other approach.  By the time the Shuttle 
entered development, analytical techniques had matured enough that it was possible to trade off 
the high cost of building analytical models against the enormous cost of building and operating a 
thermal vacuum chamber large enough to accommodate a full size Orbiter. In so doing, reliance 
on the interaction of aerodynamic, thermal, and structural models with new systems became 
critical.  As a result, the design of the Orbiter had to accommodate the planned in-flight 
verification of analytical models, an enormously expensive undertaking in itself.  Although the 
Shuttle validated the efficacy of this approach, it also illustrated the need for extraordinary 
attention to detail and that the state-of-the-art in analysis has not achieved perfection.  In fact, the 
implementation of this approach requires increased diligence in testing components to assure 
they have been functionally exposed to flight-like environments and operating sequences.  It 
requires careful scrutiny of all test data and an understanding of the root cause for all unexpected 
test results.  It makes the flight test program more, not less, important and requires the seamless 
integration of design, production, and operations disciplines throughout the development 
process.  Finally, there is no substitute for end-to-end functional testing whether accomplished 
on the flight article itself or through a combination of laboratory and vehicle exercises.   
Designing a system to be tested may well be the biggest challenge facing developers of new 
space systems.  
To assure safety and reliability, functions that enable a system’s fault tolerance and robustness 
through redundancy and backups need to be verified and validated. Each function intended to 
improve a system’s reliability needs to be tested to assure that it works and that unintended 
interactions and operational complexities do not defeat its intended purpose. In addition to 
nominal testing, these tests can require the exploration of off-nominal conditions, off-nominal 
operational sequences, contingency procedures, and “negative testing.” 
Teams need to identify the parts of the system that cannot be tested like flight and ensure that 
alternative methods are sufficient and appropriate surrogates.  Often testing is performed in 
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pieces, via simulators, by analysis and/or a combination of approaches when a “Test like you 
fly” approach is not possible or practical.  For these cases, great care must be taken to ensure the 
total system testing is valid. 
Tracking of requirements verification, whether accomplished through tests or other means, is 
critical for system safety and reliability. Formal tracking systems should be used to assure each 
requirement is verified against the actual flight hardware and software and that verification 
results are peer reviewed. 
MIL-STD-1540 can be used as a guideline for planning the test program that historically 
achieves success (refer to Section 1.2).  Tests should be used to verify requirements are met and
provide insight into actual system behavior, highlighting areas where response to test stimuli is 
outside of the expected or intended.  Any areas highlighted are red flags of impending problems 
and should not be ignored, whether the letter of requirements statements are met or not.  Tests 
should also be conducted using test margins to reveal behavior beyond nominal. 
Tests are performed as increasing levels of assembly, from part to component through to system.  
A test at a lower level of assembly should not be used to justify omission of a system-level test 
since it might not satisfy a system level requirement.  Conversely, a system level test should not 
be substituted for lower level tests.  Box level tests, for example, may provide a more thorough 
understanding of component level behavior in the absence of external influences such that 
problems can be uncovered, understood, and corrected in a more timely and cost-effective 
manner. 
Existing hardware/software, heritage elements, and COTS products can contain defects.  All 
components of a system in mission critical applications; therefore, regardless of their origin, 
must be tested with the same rigor that is applied to new designs. 
Flight software should be verified by using real-time simulations.  Such simulations should run 
flight code on flight hardware components (hardware-in-the-loop).  Crew interfaces should be 
incorporated by appropriate functions exercised by crewmembers or their proxy (with the 
participation of Human Factors Engineering). 
Reviewing test results is as critical as performing the test in the first place. Tests seek to identify 
where the system may not perform as expected and that requires teams to review data, identify 
adverse trends, precursors to failure, and warning signs that the system may not function as 
intended. Teams should “listen to what the hardware is telling you." 
When unexpected conditions or trends are observed they need to be documented and chased to 
proximate and root causes. Teams need to choose prospective corrective action with reliability, 
safety, and mission success in mind.  Test discrepancies whose cause or corrective action cannot 
be definitively defined and their reoccurrence may have significant safety or mission success 
consequences should be flagged and input to the risk management process as discussed in 
Section 2.5. 
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2.4.6 Operate, “Fly Like You Test” 
Although the conducting of mission operations is beyond the scope of this document, those 
operations do provide an important component of the process of designing for mission success. 
Just as systems should “Test like you fly,” systems must also “Fly like you test” to avoid 
encountering uncertain responses to untested conditions or sequences.  That is, verifications only 
have validity if synchronized with the operations that they have verified.  Thus, nominal and 
contingency operations should be conducted, as closely as possible, as planned in the previously 
conducted test program. 
Despite all best efforts, anomalies will occur during mission operations.  When they do occur, 
anomalies should be cataloged in a database using a rational structure that allows easy search for 
trends, repeating anomalies, and precursors to failure.  Categorization of anomalies should be 
consistent with reliability, safety, and mission success drivers that may be used to uncover 
trends.  Once understood, each anomaly should be chased to proximate and root causes.   The 
cause is then translated into Program risk and, when risk is beyond acceptable thresholds, 
corrective action should be taken.
To satisfactorily resolve flight anomalies, sufficient data on vehicle performance must be 
available.  This requires a set of flight instrumentation.  The temptation to limit the 
instrumentation set to save weight, power, or cost should be resisted. Thorough resolution of any 
on-orbit anomaly helps not only the next mission of series, but has the potential to prevent 
failures on unrelated programs as well.  Even if only unexpected behavior not resulting in a 
failure occurs, the data collected during the mission may be used to surface impending problems 
or improve models and simulations further reducing risk (refer to Section 2.2.2 Quantitative 
Requirement and Supporting Analysis, Establishing Failures Rates and Uncertainty). 
Reviewing flight results is critical to identify adverse trends, precursors to failure, and warning 
signs that the system may not have functioned as intended.  Systems often offer warning signs, 
“close calls,” or “near misses” before failing catastrophically. 
When unexpected conditions or trends are observed they need to be documented and chased to 
proximate and root causes. Teams need to choose prospective corrective action with reliability, 
safety, and mission success in mind. Flight discrepancies, whose cause or corrective action 
cannot be definitively defined and their reoccurrence may have significant safety or mission 
success consequences, should be flagged and input to the risk management process as discussed 
in Section 2.5. 
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2.5  Integrating Risk 
Risk integration is an activity performed collectively by technical and management teams with 
the goal of understanding and appreciating the total risk state of the Program by consequence 
irrespective of the risk identification method.  Risk integration provides management with 
information necessary to identify, understand, and evaluate risk trades throughout the life of the 
Program.  
2.5.1 Identifying and Classifying Risks  
One of the major challenges for Program-wide risk management involves integrating risks with 
differing consequence and rating scales into a single high, medium, low scale or a single 5 x 5 
risk matrix. Disparate safety, mission success, and development risks are hard to compare on a 
single scale because of different consequence and likelihood scales as shown below. Safety, 
mission success, and development risk types utilize differing techniques for identifying 
individual risks as well. 
x Safety risks involve personnel injury and loss of life; rating scales are logarithmic and range 
from 0.1 to 10-6 (NPR 8715.3 NASA Safety Manual). 
x Mission success risks involve the inability to meet and complete the mission requirements; 
rating scales are also logarithmic with ranges from .1 to 10-4 (scale varies by program). 
x Development risks involve the inability to deliver a quality product on time and within cost, 
often also called Programmatic Risk; rating scales tend to be linear from .1 to .9. 
The objective is group risks with common or similar consequences together so that they can be 
evaluated and ranked.  Figure 2.5-1 shows a hierarchy for collecting risks according to a 
consequence-based focus. The consequence focus helps team members focus on the top-down 
perspective while identifying risks and causes them to seek an understanding of the risk’s 
ultimate consequence. 
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Figure 2.5-1 Consequence Focused Risk Types
Section 2.4 describes a multilayered approach applied throughout the system’s life cycle to field 
a safe and reliable system.  Inherent to each layer is a mechanism for capturing, evaluating, and 
resolving off-nominal conditions shown below:
x Design and manufacturing processes create Waivers, Deviations, and MRB.
x Independent technical reviews create Action Items and RIDs.
x Inspection and walk downs create in process Inspection Discrepancy Reports.
x Testing with a “Test like you fly” approach creates Test Discrepancy Reports or Problem 
Failure Reports.
x Identifying where “Test like you fly” cannot be followed and therefore accomplished in 
pieces can represent risk. 
x Operating the system creates In-Flight Anomaly Reports and Trend Analysis Results. 
Figure 2.5-2 shows a desirable risk information flow that includes the different risk identification 
methods that are used during all phases of a program.  The figure includes typical risk 
identification activities, risk ranking, and summarizing activities that constitute risk integration.  
It also shows where the additional information on acceptable risk and project resources integrate 
into the risk management decisions.  Decision outcomes are captured and utilized to reduce risk 
and communicate risk to stakeholders. Risks are continuously monitored to see that controls are 
effective and emerging or missing risks are identified. 
Risk sources include off-nominal conditions and close calls that can warn of potential failures or 
serve as a precursor to failure.  Each of these off-nominal conditions needs a closure process that 
identifies, captures, and integrates any residual risk, as well as a method to validate assumptions 
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and models used in the risk analysis process. If risks cannot be definitively resolved, there may 
be a residual safety or mission success risk. These residual risks should be identified and tracked. 
Residual risk can be characterized by the potential for the problem to reoccur because the 
original off-nominal condition could not be either definitively identified or definitively corrected.  
An individual off-nominal issue may not represent a risk by itself, but a large number of 
individual small risk issues can sum and integrate to a large amount of total program risk.   
Warning signs and potential precursors to failure evident from trend analysis, “close calls” or 
“near misses,” provide useful inputs for risk managers.  Trend analysis , using tools such as SPC 
or Crow-AMSAA, can provide advance warning that performance or margins are degrading.
“close calls” and “near misses” indicate the reduction of margin or indicate the potential for 
more serious consequences should the operational sequence or the environment vary in an 
adverse direction.  Some of these unexpected situations may indicate that assumptions or 
modeling needs to be updated.  Teams should establish a mechanism for identifying these kinds 
of warning signs or precursors and incorporate results into risk assessments. 
Total program risk is represented by the accumulated and combined risk of all these sources 
described above. There are a number of tools and processes for managing risks, including 
continuous risk management (CRM), NASA NPR 8000.417, and MIL STD 882.  These processes 
require continuing activities to identify, analyze plan, track/monitor, and control risks as they are 
identified and ideally retired during the program.  CRM is being implemented throughout 
NASA, and including Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.  It is very important the entire 
program be vigilant in identifying and closing out risks. 
The risk management process is something that requires participation rather than observation. 
Having NASA intimately involved in the design process, as part of integrated design teams that 
produce analyses consistent with the development of the design, provides real-time insight into 
system design development and allows NASA to collect information relevant to the system 
without the necessity of making special requests to the contractors or modifications to their 
contracts.  Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) successfully applied this approach during the 
early development process of the TR-107 engine. 
Indicators of a good CRM process are signs of management ownership during Program reviews 
and meetings (i.e., management is fully engaged in the process), the program is dynamic (i.e., 
risks are being identified and retired), and team members feel free to identify risks for the 
program. 
17 NASA NPR 8000.4, Risk Management Procedural Requirements w/Change 1
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Figure 2.5-2 Risk Information Flow 
CRM is in place throughout the life of the Program.  SE interacts with the CRM process by 
evaluating the design requirements and constraints and identifying risks.  Risks can be viewed as 
requirements unmet or constraints exceeded.  The impact of the risk on the Program must be 
evaluated in a top-down manner across the Program to establish operating risk margin within the 
element.  The likelihood of occurrence must also be evaluated by the Program element.  This 
information is then used to prioritize efforts within Program elements to control risk within their 
purview.  If a Program element risk becomes real (e.g., performance below/approaching 
minimum requirements, schedule delay, failure event), SE and risk models are used to respond to 
the problem from the top-down by changing requirements, or constraints, adding resources 
where most appropriate.   
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2.5.2 Incremental Acceptance of Risk 
Sometimes risk is accepted and accumulated in small increments. Each of the increments by 
itself may not appreciably increase total risk. However, a large number of small risks can interact 
(amplify), aggregate, and accumulate to a much higher risk state. The tools and techniques 
should provide a mechanism for decision makers and managers to assess the total risk state 
represented by all the small increments of risk 
2.5.3 Evaluating and Trading Disparate Risks 
Comparing safety, mission success, and development risks types is important for allocating a 
common pool of technical, cost, and schedule resources to obviate or mitigate risk. 
Trades between disparate risks require a technique for evaluating total risk. For example trade-
offs between eliminating testing to reduce development risk, but increasing mission success risk 
requires a figure of merit in total risk space. Likewise, comparing the risk of hypergolic fuels 
versus the reliability of the propulsion system necessary to return the crew from the Moon 
requires a figure of merit. 
Balancing risks requires people and judgment. There is no unique way to make these types of 
decisions, but there is a systematic way.  While this method cannot assure success, it can ensure 
against failure. Decision making on an ad hoc and local basis does not consider downstream or 
across interface impacts.  A CRM process will ensure risks are identified and exposed to 
decisions makers and stakeholders in the Project (especially the Astronaut Office).  The process 
will also ensure transparent rationale is used in making the decision.  Figure 2.5-2 illustrates how 
different assessment methods, shown on the right, supply risk information into risk integration 
and risk management functions. 
A key difficulty in the process is the integration of risks into a coherent framework.  Decisions to 
accept risk should be integrated with the cost and performance dimensions of the constraint 
“Box,” Figure 2.0-2.  Decision options must be made using figures of merit (FOMs) that are 
relevant to the Program requirements, resources, and constraints.  A few well-formulated FOMs 
will simplify the process and aid in transparency. FOMs can be cost, probability of loss of crew, 
technical performance measures, etc. 
Risk is the combination of likelihood and consequence.  A key element of risk is uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can be stochastic in nature, such as the likelihood of completing a mission or can 
result from a lack of knowledge (“unknown unknowns”).  Investments in test programs, 
simulation modeling, analysis, and engineering model evaluation can reduce this latter 
uncertainty by increasing knowledge.  In this sense, development risks are caused by lack of 
knowledge and can be retired as the Program progresses towards launch. Identifying and 
considering uncertainty is an important element in risk assessment. Figure 2.5-3 compares risk 
assessment methods. As indicated in Section 2.2, the probabilistic methods encourage a deeper 
understanding of risks sources and what factors are important for reducing likelihood, 
consequences, and uncertainty. 
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Figure 2.5-3 Qualitative, Quantitative, and Probabilistic Assessment Methods 
Adapted from: Schutzenhofer, L.A., Chapter 14.2, “Space Launch and Transportation Risk,” in NASA MSFC 
Course “ Space Launch and Transportation Systems: Design and Operations,” August 2006 
When the launch occurs, the mission risk is comprised of the stochastic uncertainly plus any 
residual lack of knowledge and unretired mission success risk.  Figure 2.5-4 shows a notional 
example of how total risk, comprised of development risk plus safety/mission success risk, 
changes over time.  This notional example shows how eliminating a test will reduce the 
development risk (i.e., the test will not fail and affect the schedule by finding and fixing the 
problem), but increases mission risk.  Risk management strategies must take these types of trades 
into account. 
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 Figure 2.5-4 Life Cycle Risk Profile
2.5.2  Integrating Cost Risk Performance Model into CRM  
A top-down cost, risk, and performance model can be used to help managers put lower-level 
risks in context of the entire program.  This model can be used to evaluate the effects of Program 
elements failing to meet requirements or operate within their constraints.  These risk drivers can 
be used to identify risk criticality used in CRM risk matrices that are developed at lower levels of 
the Program.  Top-down SE must be involved in evaluating the likelihood and consequences of 
risks that interact across system boundaries. For example, the risk of an inadvertent retro-rocket 
system fire could be evaluated at the subsystem level due to its obvious consequences, but a 
failure to fire may depend on the capability of other systems to mitigate the failure and needs to 
be evaluated to a higher level. 
Using a top-down model to evaluate and assess risks overcomes the difficulty in comparing risks 
that have different likelihood or consequence scales and synergistic effects (interactions between 
risks are assumed to be independent or constant). For this process to work successfully, risk 
drivers should be described using a quantitative method so that criteria can be established in the 
context of the entire system including cost and performance.  If the risk becomes too high 
because of violating cost/schedule, performance, or reliability/safety requirements, the concerns 
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and issues can be elevated.
From a top-down perspective, the risks at lower levels are the likelihood that a requirement or 
constraint will fail to be met and the impact of the failure on the program.  The impact of the 
failure must be considered using an integrated method, in context with the state of knowledge of 
the system as a whole.  For instance, a reduced performance may not be important if there is 
sufficient margin in other parts of the system.  The performance reduction will then decrease the 
margin of those systems and increase their risk profile by increasing the consequences if their 
performance degrades.  Therefore, setting risk criteria at lower levels is a dynamic process that 
must be continuous.
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
102 of 133
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
3.0 Safety and Reliability Analysis throughout the Life Cycle 
Reliability analyses and risk assessment has been applied in many industries, and the level of 
acceptance in those industries becomes very high once decision-makers can apply the results of 
the analysis to their problems.  Risk-based design and applications have become an important 
input to NASA decisions.  As confidence in the benefits of the approaches, tools, and techniques 
is gained, the role of risk assessment becomes central to addressing key safety and reliability 
issues.
To realize the maximum benefit from reliability analysis, it is essential to integrate the risk 
and reliability analysts within the design teams. The importance of this cannot be overstated. In 
many cases, the reliability and risk analysts perform the analysis on the design after it has been 
formulated. In this case, safety and reliability features are added on or out-sourced rather than 
designed in. The result is an unrealistic analysis that is not focused on risk drivers, and does not 
provide value to the design.
To be successful, the techniques described here need to be performed by the design team with 
the analysts facilitating the process. The models and results need to be owned by the design 
team. Risk analysts provide a skeptical view that gives a valuable balance to the naturally 
optimistic view of designers, while their top-down understanding of the role of elements within 
an integrated system or architecture helps the team focus on risk drivers.  This teamwork assures 
that the rigorous process is followed (reliability practitioner) and that the technical aspects and 
operational considerations are thoroughly explored (system designer). The designer’s 
involvement also assures that the correct and latest design and operational sequence is analyzed. 
Risk and reliability analyses evolve to answer key questions about design trades as the design 
matures.  Reliability analyses lead the growth of information about the system and provide 
guidance for system risk drivers.  Section 2.5 of the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook 
describes the process of identifying decision drivers, investigating those drivers to make a 
decision, and then increase resolution for the next level of detail until a full design is realized. 
Figure 3.1-1 shows key reliability engineering activities and how the focus changes throughout 
the systems engineering life cycle.  
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Figure 3.1-1 Systems Engineering Life Cycle with Reliability Focus 
The fidelity and level of detail for reliability analyses is driven by the information necessary to 
understand the risk drivers and create alternatives that will change the cost/performance and risk 
profile of the system, not by design phasing alone.  The key to making this process work is 
focusing on giving the decision maker information.  In this context, information is defined as the 
“differences that make a difference”18.  This concept will allow the investigation of many more 
design options while expending minimal resources necessary to chose the best solution. Keys to 
successful risk and reliability analysis are: 
x The level of detail included in a reliability analysis should be commensurate with the 
available design information and the level of insight being addressed.
x Too much detail impedes transparency, increases cost, and makes it difficult to manipulate 
the models. Detail does not equal quality. 
x There should be a direct link between heritage and the risk model elements.  Credible risk 
assessments link the design under consideration with empirical evidence from heritage 
designs.
x The cost-benefit ratio for performing risk assessment is highest during conceptual design. 
x The analysis is typically performed in a conservative fashion to identify risk drivers that need 
to be resolved in ongoing activities. Details developed based on their importance to the risk 
of the system. 
18 Gregory Bateson’s definition of information. 
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x Provide a top-down integrating context for understanding the system.  
x Structure of the analysis is driven by the concept of operations, system design, and hazards 
faced by the system. 
x Independent of the artificial boundaries generated by hierarchies of requirements and system 
decompositions.  
Careful peer review of reliability analysis is critical.  Review by knowledgeable designers and 
operators are more important than a review of the math in the calculations themselves. It is 
important to review analysis inputs, assumptions, and uncertainties, as well as the results.  The 
review needs to resolve any disconnect with the system designers "gut feeling" and what the 
analysis produces.  Outputs should be understandable to design engineering and management.  
The results should agree with expert intuition or help identify where and why the intuition is 
flawed.
3.1 Formulation Phases 
Reliability analyses are used for risk assessment in the early phases of the design process to 
develop requirements and design concepts that can meet the requirements.  The following 
aspects of reliability analyses and risk assessments are described for each life cycle phase:  
1. Phase Objective 
2. Role of Risk and Reliability Analysis 
3. Risk and Reliability Techniques 
4. Indicators of Proper Reliability and Risk Analysis 
Details for each phase will be consolidated into Tables 3.3-1 through 3.3-3 for reference and ease 
of use. 
3.1.1 Pre-Phase A Advanced Studies 
Phase Objective
Iterate concepts and requirements to identify feasibility and risk profiles for various options and 
alternatives.  The focus is to identify multiple feasible solutions through the investigation of 
alternatives, ensuring the overall goals can be achieved within resource constraints. 
Role of Risk and Reliability Analysis in Pre-Phase A
The role of risk and reliability in this process is to ensure that risk and reliability objectives are 
realistic (heritage information, mission complexity, and development risks are properly 
accounted for), and there is sufficient performance and cost/schedule margin to field a system 
without compromising reliability. It is the job of risk/reliability analysis/personnel to challenge 
and document, at least at a top level, inconsistencies in requirements, lifetime, and environments 
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that affect reliability and safety.  If these inconsistencies are brought to the forefront then it is 
easier for the decision makers to understand and accept. 
The typical information generated for performance (Make it Work) analysis is insufficient for 
performing risk assessments at this stage. For a risk assessment to take place, some strawman 
details need to be in place. These details include mission specific events that potentially drive 
risks (Launch Vehicle Type, Propulsion Systems employed, and sizing). Critical events (usually 
involving change in velocity, delta-V, but also involving docking, long-term operations, and 
operating environments) for the missions must be identified in enough detail to determine how to 
tailor surrogate elements that represent risk.  Another key element in the reliability analysis is the 
ability of the architecture to compensate for off-nominal conditions and employ mechanisms 
(diverse or redundant) to save the crew. 
With this information, it is possible to gain an understanding of the risk profile of the 
architecture.  This also provides the decision makers with a rough understanding of the driving 
factors and the likelihood of failures for missions. The analysis in this phase should be 
conservative in nature such that as analysis matures, the likelihood of being outside the box is 
low.
Techniques of Risk and Reliability Analysis in Pre-Phase A
Techniques that can be employed for qualitative assessments include Functional FMEA to 
understand failure modes of mission elements, ESDs to capture operational concepts, scoping 
risk assessments using surrogate PRA, and heritage data19,20 to aggregate and estimate risks.  If 
there is uncertainty about the viability of a concept, detailed models may be in order.  For 
instance, the MAST21 tool is being applied to understand the likelihood of successfully launching 
two vehicles for a lunar target in a finite amount of time constrained by weather and daylight 
conditions.  This information can be used to set requirements for Lunar Surface Access Module 
(LSAM) loiter capability/reliability mission definition. 
Indicators of Proper Reliability and Risk Analysis in Pre-Phase A
The reliability and risk analysis should be documented in a transparent fashion.  The Pre-Phase A 
column in Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, and 3.3-3 summarize some specific activity details necessary for 
19 Fragola, J.  et al.  "Reliability and Crew Safety Assessment for a Solid Rocket Booster/J-2S Launcher", 
Proceedings of the 2006 RAMS Symposium, Newport  
Beach, CA. 
20 ESAS Reliability Analysis Chapter 8 and Appendices 
21 The Manifest Assessment Simulation Tool (MAST) is a discrete event simulation environment using Rockwell 
Software’s Arena, ExpertFit by Averill M. Law and Associates and the Microsoft Office suite of Excel, Word, 
PowerPoint, and Visio. The Manifest Assessment Simulation Tool (MAST) was developed for the Space Shuttle 
program (Cates 2004; Cates and Mollaghasemi 2005). MAST benefited from the space shuttle model developed in 
2001 (Cates et al. 2002). 
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this life cycle phase.  The documentation should include an identification of key assumptions and 
sensitivities, with uncertainty.  Results should identify the reliability drivers and their ranking. 
The documents should be explicit enough to allow for an independent peer review of the trades 
and analysis.  Just as the analysis was created by the integrated design team, an integrated team 
of similar composition should perform the peer review.  The peer review should focus on 
reasonableness of the assumptions, modeling and estimates, and identification of risk drivers.
The models, data, and documentation should be in a form that can be transmitted to the Phase A 
team, and referenced and re-used by other studies. 
3.1.2 Phase A Preliminary Analysis  
Phase Objective
Phase A seeks to converge requirements, design, and operations concepts towards a single 
feasible solution that meets its performance and risk requirements within acceptable cost and 
schedule constraints. This is particularly true because this is the very first time the team will 
commit to a product for a price, so it is important that it is scoped correctly. 
Reliability analyses are integral to this effort as described in Section 2.3.  An iterative design 
loop establishes optimal system requirements, top-level architecture, and operations concept.
Once a desired mission concept has been identified, then the derived requirements are solidified.  
The confirmation of a good Phase A is a system architecture meeting its cost/schedule, 
performance, and risk constraint box.  
The elements of the system should have been analyzed to establish confidence that there is 
sufficient margin to the requirements such that the Phase A design can be built under the 
constraints and within the requirements.  The cost benefit ratio for effective Phase A activities is 
enormous.  For Phase A activities to be effective they need to focus on the drivers. 
Role of Risk and Reliability Analysis in Phase A
Risk and reliability analysis help designers understand the interrelationships of requirements, 
constraints, and resources, and uncover key relationships and drivers so they can be properly 
considered.  The analyst must help designers go beyond the requirements to understand implicit 
dependencies that emerge as the design concept matures. It is unrealistic to assume that design 
requirements will correctly capture all risk and reliability issues and “force” a reliable design. 
System impacts of designs must play a key role in the design.  Making designers aware of 
impacts of their decisions on overall mission reliability is key.  
Finding Feasible Solutions
The search for a feasible solution should begin with the simplest possible version of the 
mission and vehicles (the de minimis configuration22).  This version is potentially the 
22 De minimis is a Latin expression meaning about minimal things. 
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most reliable.  Once the de minimis mission is identified, it is analyzed to identify risk 
drivers. The risk drivers are attacked:  either eliminated or their impact reduced by 
providing fault tolerance to reduce their likelihood to an acceptable level.  The use of 
redundancy and diversity is analyzed to provide margin for loss of mission and loss of 
crew.  The mission is then re-analyzed from a performance perspective to make sure it 
will close. Once the minimal risk mission is defined, then additional performance or 
return is added to achieve expanded goals.  The risk and cost impact of these additions is 
then calculated so that decision makers can see the effects of adding content to the 
mission.  This process ends when the cost or risk criteria are reached.  This is the 
preferred way to search for a solution since it is very difficult to de-scope missions or 
reduce capabilities to get in the risk cost box.
Increasing Fidelity of Baseline Models 
The baseline models to estimate risk for the Pre-Phase A study are expanded to include 
more details of the specific options being considered.  Human reliability analysis is 
performed if there are critical human interactions.  The additional modeling is focused on 
risk drivers and the differences between options.  To define system requirements, some 
assumptions must be made.  As stated before, the requirements should be flexible, but 
configuration management is imperative so that analysis is consistent across teams.  As 
more information is gained about specific missions and vehicle configurations, the 
generic events of the Pre-Phase A models can become more specific.  The risk models 
should be complete in that all risks should be captured even if at a conceptual level. 
Risk in Trade Studies 
One conceptual difficulty is that in the end, different configurations may well result in 
equal risks, but require significantly different development and test programs to achieve 
the same level of reliability.  Therefore, safety or mission success risk may not be a 
differentiator between missions or systems.  The difference between elements is reflected 
in development risk, cost, or performance impacts needed to equalize reliability and 
safety risks.  
It may be impossible to make risks equivalent between concepts no matter how many 
resources are applied.  This makes it impossible to make apples-to-apples comparisons.  
If the risks cannot be made equal, each system should be made to be cost effective from a 
risk perspective, and the change in risk noted in the result.  This is the reason the trades 
must be integrated with performance/return and cost.  The result of the study is a set of 
alternatives with different cost risk performance frontiers23 (surfaces) within the cost risk 
performance box.  Based on the shapes of the frontiers and the margins to the boundary, 
23 Finding Pareto Frontiers is particularly useful in engineering.  By yielding all of the potentially optimal solutions, 
a designer can make focused tradeoffs within this constrained set of parameters, rather than needing to consider the 
full ranges of parameters. 
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the decision maker can make a choice.  If a decision maker does not leave sufficient 
margin in the choice, system reliability may ultimately suffer due to truncated testing or 
rushing to launch.
Phase A Inputs 
Concept of Operations 
o Mission Scenarios 
o Contingency Plans 
Design
o Alternative design concepts are developed 
o Models focused on closing the mission for alternatives Vehicle Configurations 
and Layouts 
o System Block Diagrams 
Physics modes for critical aborts 
Requirements 
o Needs Statement  
o Value Function for alternative returns 
o Risk Targets 
o Time Frame 
o Funding Profile 
o Constraints
o Requirement Sets need to be derived for alternative missions and vehicles, rather 
than a given 
Techniques of Risk and Reliability Analysis in Phase A
Functional FMEA and preliminary hazard analysis establish failure modes of the hardware. 
Environmental hazards for the design and failure to complete critical steps of the operations 
concept are combined with potential failure modes in event sequence diagrams.  Physics-based 
models are combined with the functional FMEA and hazards to understand critical mission 
failures and potential recovery strategies.  In some cases, detailed physics models are needed to 
understand critical failure modes, their effects, and warning times necessary to establish 
performance requirements and timing for back-up systems.  These details require investigations 
into accident physics such as those performed by the Simulation Assisted Risk Assessment24
tool.  This tool can be used to establish the likelihood that a crew escape system will perform as 
required and help set escape requirements.  Heritage-based scoping PRA models can be used to 
evaluate the relative likelihood of scenarios and help identify drivers for mission reliability and 
24 Lawrence, S., “Simulation Assisted Risk Assessment,” AIAA Paper 2006-0090, Reno, NV, January 2006. 
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crew safety so that the design can be balanced.  Discrete event simulations, Monte Carlo models, 
and Markov models can be used to evaluate time dependent events than cannot be done 
analytically.  
Indicators of Proper Reliability and Risk Analysis in Phase A
The reliability and risk analysis should be documented in a transparent fashion.  The 
documentation should include an identification of key assumptions and sensitivities, with 
uncertainty.  The Phase A column in Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, and 3.3-3 summarize some specific 
activity details necessary for this life cycle phase. 
The documents should be explicit enough to allow for an independent peer review of the trades 
and analysis.  Just as the analysis was created by the integrated design team, an integrated team 
of similar composition should perform the peer review.  The peer review should focus on 
reasonableness of the assumptions, modeling and estimates, and identification of risk drivers. 
The peer review should also examine the analysis for completeness to ensure all credible risk 
drivers are identified.  The models, data, and documentation should be in a form that can be 
transmitted to the Phase B team, and referenced and re-used by other studies. 
3.1.3 Phase B Definition 
Phase Objective
The objective of Phase B is to define the project in enough detail to establish an initial baseline 
and preliminary design capable of meeting mission needs and is achievable within technical, 
cost, schedule, and risk constraints.  Sufficient details are developed to formulate and approve a 
program plan.  
Role of Risk and Reliability Analysis in Phase B
The role of risk and reliability in this process is: 
 Integrate designs from a reliability point of view. 
 Ensure that failure modes are obviated to the maximum extent possible. 
 Controls on failure modes are cost effective, and take into account the entire system. 
 Ensure that reliability goals can be met. 
 Assist in the obviation and mitigation of risks. 
Given that the requirements and design concepts were properly defined in Phase A, the purpose 
of the reliability activities is to demonstrate that the design will have a high likelihood of meeting 
the requirements.  Since information that is more concrete is available about the systems and the 
concepts of operation, the analysis can begin on terms that are more concrete using established 
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techniques such as those discussed in MIL STD 88225.  The design and concept of operations 
should be thoroughly examined for accident initiators and hazards that could lead to mishaps.  
Conservative estimates of likelihood and consequences of the hazards can be used as a basis for 
applying design resources to reduce the risk of failures.
Techniques of Risk and Reliability Analysis in Phase B
MIL STD 882 provides excellent guidance on the steps necessary to design a reliable system. 
Consideration should be given to integrating this process with existing processes.  One weakness 
in the document is the reliance of qualitative measures for assessing the frequency and 
consequences of mishaps and criteria for acceptable conditions.  These deficiencies make it 
difficult to gain an integrated picture of risks and establish cost benefit of alternative risk 
mitigation strategies, especially for manned spacecraft systems with their inherent high levels of 
risk. However, the addition of quantitative measures within the general framework of the 
guidance provided by the standard significantly improves the ability to assess risks.  
Integration with the Design Team 
The implementation of this process requires deep knowledge of the element being 
designed and its context in the overall program.  This knowledge cannot be pre-described 
in requirements.  The process depends on an integrated design team that can put the 
design in context with the entire system and identify as many possible design solutions as 
possible.  Reliability analysts facilitate the process and help focus on risk significant 
aspects of the design, but are not the sole author of the analysis.  The quality of the design 
is dependent on the quality of the team members and ownership by the engineering 
organization; it cannot be weighed or measured.  The quality of the process must be 
gauged through direct participation in the design meetings.  Insights from design or 
documentation reviews performed after the design is complete may come too late to 
efficiently impact program success. 
Verification of Compliance with Requirements 
Verification that a system is meeting its quantitative risk goals can be accomplished by 
extending the top down scoping risk assessments to a level of detail consistent with the 
risks identified in the design.  The analysis should be complete, in that all risk drivers 
have been addressed (design and operational requirements established, and quantified to 
the extent practical) and risks are acceptable.  Results of risk analysis can be used to 
resolve issues when the application of additional mass or redundancy, necessary to 
comply with predefined requirements is of questionable or negative value.  For a risk 
analysis to be credible, it must be transparent and connected to the design heritage and 
physics of the system and its environment.  Direct use of handbook data alone for space 
25 Department of Defense Standard Proactive for System Safety, Mil STD-882D,10 February 2000 
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systems is of questionable value and hurts the credibility of the analysis with engineers 
and decision makers.  It must be recognized that for most of their lives, the reliability of 
space systems is directly related to flight experience rather than “random” hardware 
faults.  Risk assessments must use a much heritage data as possible and consider the 
effects of common cause.
Indicators of a Proper Reliability and Risk Analysis in Phase B
In Phase B, the reliability effort shifts from establishing reliability requirements and an 
architecture to analyzing a preliminary design and assessing its compliance with requirements. 
The reliability and risk analysis should be documented in a transparent fashion.  The analysis 
should be complete, as quantitatively as practical, in that all risk drivers have been addressed 
(design/operational requirements established) and risks are acceptable.  Results should indicate 
preliminary design compliance with requirements along with any deficiencies and 
recommendations for change.  The Phase B column in Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, and 3.3-3 summarize 
some specific activity details necessary for this life cycle phase. 
Derived requirements generated by any analysis for the final flight design should be included in 
the requirements management system, along with their rationale. The documentation should 
include an identification of key assumptions and sensitivities, along with the associated 
uncertainty.  The documents should be explicit enough to allow for an independent peer review 
of the trades and analysis.  The peer review should focus on reasonableness of the assumptions, 
modeling, estimates, and identification of risk drivers.  The peer review should also examine the 
analysis for completeness to ensure that all credible risk drivers are identified.  Just as the 
analysis was created by the integrated design team, an integrated team of similar composition 
should perform the peer review.  The models, data, and documentation should be in a form that 
can be transmitted to the Phase C Team, and referenced and re-used by other studies. 
3.2 Implementation Phases 
The final design, manufacturing, and operation phases use risk assessments and reliability 
techniques to verify that the design is meeting its risk and reliability goals and help develop 
mitigation strategies when the goals are not met or discrepancies/failures occur.  Human 
reliability analysis should be performed on critical design, production, assembly, test, and 
mission operations elements assuring the design is producible with the requisite reliability. 
3.2.1 Phase C Design
The purpose of this phase is to establish a complete validated design that is ready to design, 
code, and manufacture.  If the design was correctly defined, this phase results in a design that 
fully meets the requirements within constraints with margin.  Trade studies are to optimize sub-
elements of the design focusing on lower level design decisions assuring they remain within their 
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overall requirements and constraints.  If the definition phase is defective, SE may need to re-visit 
trades to establish a new definition that can be realized with acceptable risk.  
Just as in the preliminary design process, the analysis matures as the design is completed.  If the 
Phase B analysis and design were performed correctly, the risk drivers and requirements should 
have already been identified along with effective solutions.  This phase of the analysis continues 
to validate the system design from a risk perspective by focusing on the final design details 
ensuring that all risk drivers have been identified and design details do not degrade or introduce 
new risk drivers.
The detailed application of risk analysis tools (Fault Trees, FMEAs, and Risk Assessments) are 
used to document the compliance of the design with the requirements and ensure that the risk 
drivers for the system continue to be identified and resolved.  Process FMEAs are used to assure 
that manufacturing and integration processes are sufficiently robust.  The documentation and 
models serve as a way to capture the design basis and rational for use in resolving problems and 
implementing design changes during development and operation.  
Indicators of a Proper Reliability and Risk Analysis in Phase C
Reliability analyses should be complete and show that reliability requirements are met. 
Reliability analysis of the final design should be documented in a fashion that allows 
independent peer review.  Results should indicate compliance with requirements along with any 
deficiencies and recommendations for change. The Phase C column in Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, and 
3.3-3 summarize some specific activity details necessary for this life cycle phase. 
The various reliability analyses used to verify requirements should be consistent with each other. 
The quantitative analyses should support the qualitative analyses and compliance with fault 
tolerance assessments.  For example, the qualitative analyses should support design for minimum 
risk rationale. 
Analysis results should include an identification of key assumptions and sensitivities with 
uncertainty.  The documents should be explicit enough to allow for an independent peer review 
of the design choices and analysis.  The peer review should focus on reasonableness of the 
assumptions, modeling, estimates, and identification of risk drivers.  The peer review should also 
examine the analysis for completeness to ensure that all credible risk drivers are identified. Just 
as the analysis was created by the integrated design team, an integrated team of similar 
composition should perform the peer review.  The models, data, and documentation should be in 
a form that can be used later in the life cycle and referenced and re-used by other studies. 
3.2.2 Phase D Development
The purpose of this phase is to build the subsystems and integrate them into a complete system, 
developing confidence that the system will be able to meet its requirements.  The system should 
then be deployed, ensuring that it is ready for operations. 
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The role of reliability in this phase is to monitor the test and integration program, identify pre-
cursors to failure, and help resolve problems as they are identified.  This will assist in 
discovering the failure root causes, suggested corrective actions, and verifying that these actions 
have been implemented properly and have been effective.  The nature of space programs makes 
it difficult to use statistics from tests to develop estimates of system reliability. These statistics 
must be gleaned from operational data and subjectively extended to the system in question.  
MIL STD 882 provides the following guidance for testing a safe design:
“A.4.4.6.1 Testing for a safe design.  Tests and demonstrations must be defined to 
validate selected safety features of the system.  Test or demonstrate safety critical 
equipment and procedures to determine the mishap severity or to establish the 
margin of safety of the design.  Consider induced or simulated failures to 
demonstrate the failure mode and acceptability of safety critical equipment.  When 
it cannot be analytically determined whether the corrective action taken will 
adequately control a hazard, conduct safety tests to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the controls.  Where costs for safety testing would be prohibitive, safety 
characteristics or procedures may be verified by engineering analyses, analogy, 
laboratory test, functional mockups, or subscale/model simulation.  Integrate 
testing of safety systems into appropriate system test and demonstration plans to 
the maximum extent possible.” 
Reliability and risk analysis and techniques can be used to advise systems engineers on the 
efficacy of test protocols for achieving reliability goals.  The risk and reliability analysis should 
be part of the problem resolution process to ensure that analysis and assumptions developed in 
early phases are correct, and can help ensure that problem resolutions are effective and do not 
degrade overall system reliability. 
Indicators of a Proper Reliability and Risk Analysis in Phase D
In Phase D, the reliability efforts shift from verifying the final design to following the 
manufacturing and test efforts assuring that construction and test techniques are consistent with 
the intended reliability.  The Phase D column in Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, and 3.3-3 summarize some 
specific activity details necessary for this life cycle phase. 
Manufacturing and test results may indicate that updates to reliability models and assumptions 
are required.  Members of the reliability team should be involved in discrepancy closure on 
hardware identified as mission critical.  
Changes to the final design may also be necessary and should be reviewed by the reliability 
team. 
3.2.3 Phase E Operation 
The purpose of this phase is to meet the initially identified need.  The products of this phase are 
the operational capability achieved, and science and experiences returned from the mission. 
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The role of reliability in this phase is to monitor problem reports, and identify risk significant 
issues and their possible resolution.  Precursor analysis can be used to verify reliability estimates 
used to define the program. 
Shortcomings in existing data collection systems have hampered the ability to develop 
quantitative estimates of reliability parameters and significantly increased uncertainty and forced 
analysis to be based on handbook data.  The inability to develop reliability insights from the 
historical data illustrates the need for significant improvement in data collection and analysis.
Limited experience with space systems makes this data even more precious.  NASA should 
ensure that issues of usability and data quality are addressed in new versions of PRACA and 
that end user needs and requirements are taken into consideration. 
Indicators of a Proper Reliability and Risk Analysis in Phase E
In Phase E, the reliability efforts shift from following the manufacturing and test processes to 
assuring the system is operated in a manner consistent with its intended and assumed operations 
plan.  The Phase E column in Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, and 3.3-3 summarize some specific activity 
details necessary for this life cycle phase. 
Flight results may indicate that updates to reliability models and assumptions maybe in order. 
Members of the reliability team should be involved in flight anomaly and discrepancy closure. 
Changes to the system or its operations plan may also be necessary and should be reviewed by 
the reliability team. 
3.3 Application of Risk Analysis Tools and Techniques 
The focus and application of reliability analyses tools and techniques varies throughout the 
system life cycle as life cycle phase objectives change, information about the system matures, 
and issues occur.  Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, and 3.3-3 describe26 approaches for reliability and risk 
analysis.  The descriptions are organized by mission phase describing the scope of effort and 
types of analyses as they evolve and the program progresses along the life cycle.  The tables are 
organized into three major sections across the life cycle phases. 
x Reliability Assessment activities have been organized into the following five areas and 
described in Table 3.3-1.
1. Requirements are evaluated, defined, and flow into lower levels of the system 
hierarchy.
2. Validation and verification determines whether or not the requirements for a 
program reflect the program intentions and whether or not the developing design 
is in compliance with the requirements.  Validation and verification can be 
assessed qualitatively or quantitatively. 
26 based on a taxonomy and description originally developed for the NASA Engineering for Complex Systems 
project at Ames Research Center. 
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3. Evaluation of alternatives refers to trade studies, wherein alternative design 
solutions are evaluated to determine their potential risk, performance, and cost.  
The intent of these studies is to identify design features that discriminate among 
these parameters and regimes that appear to encompass alternative design 
alternatives. 
4. Investigations are forensic applications that identify likely causes for problems.  
It is important for the team to utilize a “physics of failure” approach when 
analyzing critical failures in addition to using the “scientific method” when faced 
with unknown or uncertain failure mechanisms.  
5. Risk integration provides management with a view of how risks are combined 
across the program and helps to focus resources on drivers. 
6. Planning and resource allocation provides information to project management 
on where project resources can be best applied to reduce risk.  The objective to 
adjust and tailor the reliability and risk analyses as needed to identify risks and 
reduce the most significant ones. 
x Analyses Techniques and Methods; see Table 3.3-2. 
1. Event Sequence Diagrams/Event Trees are models that describe the sequence of 
events and responses to off nominal conditions that occur during a mission. 
2. FMEAs are a bottom up analysis that identify the types of failures that can occur 
within a system and identify the causes, effects, and mitigating strategies that can 
be employed to control the effects of the failure.  
3. Qualitative Top-Down Logic Models identify how failures within a system can 
combine to cause an undesired event. 
4. Quantitative Logic Models (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) extend the 
qualitative models to include the likelihood of failure. This typically involves 
developing failure criteria based on system physics, and employing statistical 
techniques to estimate the likelihood of failure along with uncertainty.
5. Reliability Block Diagrams are diagrams of the elements of a system are 
combined to provide a function.  
6. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is performed early based on the functions 
performed during the mission.  PHA is a “What if” process that considers the 
potential hazard, initiating event, effect, and potential corrective measures and 
controls.  The objective is to determine if the hazard can be eliminated, and if not, 
how it can be controlled. 
7. Hazard Analysis (HA) evaluates the completed design.  HA is a “What if” 
process that considers the potential hazard, initiating event, effect, and potential 
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corrective measures and controls.  The objective is to determine if the hazard can 
be eliminated, and if not, how it can be controlled. 
8. Human Reliability Analysis is a method to understand how human failures can 
lead to system failure and estimate the likelihood of those failures. 
9. Probabilistic Structural Analysis provides a way to combine uncertainties in 
materials and loads can combine to cause failure of a structural element. 
10. Sparing/Logistics Models provide a means to estimate the interactions of 
systems in time.  These models include ground-processing simulations and 
mission campaign simulations. 
x Information for risk and reliability analysis must be available with the appropriate level 
of detail and maturity at the time of the analysis. See Table 3.3-3. 
1. Top Level Requirements representing needs, objectives, and constraints describe 
the overall objective of the program requirements and budgetary and time 
constraints.  These begin at a high level and are traded during Phase A and 
verified during later phases.
2. Operations Concept describes the sequence of operations for the mission. 
Mission design can fundamentally alter the risk and reliability of a program.  The 
manner in which architecture and design matures for a new system is a key driver.  
3. Architecture and Design affects risk through the fundamental reliability of its 
elements and the ability to employ of diverse capabilities for abort.  Employing 
new technology impacts development risk and reliability during missions. 
4. Requirements are developed and documented to fix a design and its assumptions 
so that design and analysis can proceed and remain coherent. These are captured 
as derived requirements representing design decisions critical to lower levels of 
the system hierarchy. 
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3.4 Key Issues in Quantifying Risk 
Historical data shows that system reliability is driven by generic (potentially common cause) 
failures, and that these failures causes generally decrease (reliability growth) as the system 
matures.  The low flight rates of space systems make it difficult to achieve a steady state 
reliability that results from random parts failures alone.  Therefore, quantitative analysis should 
take these factors into consideration if risk is to be accurately characterized.  This section 
discusses common cause failures, system maturity, and the use of heritage data to calibrate 
models.
3.4.1 Reliability Analysis Consideration of Common Cause Failures
Reliability models of systems sometimes make the assumption that all failures are statistically 
independent; that is, the probability of a failure is the same regardless of the state of the system.  
This assumption typically results in incredibly high reliability estimates of systems that have 
multiple strings of identical redundant components.  Experience shows that this assumption is 
usually not valid, and a conditional probability (common cause) should be used to assess the 
probability of a second failure.  Failure history described in Section 1.2 indicates a significant 
fraction of flight failure causes are “generic” in nature that can result in the failure of multiple 
units.  These kinds of “generic” causes are broadly identified as “common cause” in the 
following sections. 
To thoroughly assess system reliability, there are two "knobs" on the reliability models: the 
"statistically independent" or random failure and "dependent" or “common cause" failures.  
Using both terms helps to evaluate the effectiveness of failure mitigation strategies and avoids an 
overdependence on redundancy.  Mitigation of common cause failure usually requires a diverse 
path.  The benefit of the diverse path is directly correlated with its independence from the failure 
cause.
Figure 3.4-1 shows probability estimates for conditional probabilities for failures of second 
through fourth strings of equipment.  The lower left corner shows a notional probability that a 
first string will fail.  The probability of a first string failure is seen to be relatively small.  The 
three broad bands (one green and two grey) above and to the right of the first string failure 
probability represent a set of estimates for the probability of a second string failing given that the 
first string has failed; the probability of a third string failing given that two strings have failed; 
and the probability of a fourth string failing given that three strings have failed, respectively. 
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Figure 3.4-1 Conditional Probabilities of Multiple Failures of Identical Components 
Some studies have been performed on second string failures (ref. 2 and ref. 3) on Space Shuttle 
components and other non-aerospace sources (ref. 3).  As shown in the green block in Figure 
3.4-1, a range of failure probabilities was determined in each of these references that include 
uncertainty. The four references are all in relatively good agreement to allow an estimating range 
of probabilities for the second string failures shown as the green line in Figure 3.4-1. 
Estimates for the third and fourth string failures for aerospace components are more difficult to 
find.  No studies have been conducted to provide definitive estimates for third and fourth string 
failures for spacecraft components since such a high degree of redundancy is rare.  However, 
extensive studies have been performed by the commercial nuclear power industry in this area 
that provides some insight to allow reasonable estimates to be made.  Although the industries 
requirements are very different, both require very high levels of safety and, therefore, both use 
stringent manufacturing, inspection, and testing processes to ensure high reliability.  Data 
derived from the nuclear industry (NUREG-5485) for the third and fourth failures result in 
estimates spanning 0.57 for the third string and 0.65 for the fourth string.  Using these generic 
nuclear industry estimates, engineering judgment was applied to establish credible ranges for 
these parameters as shown in Figure 3.4-1.  Note the broad bands signifying the large uncertainty 
in these estimates.  
A key insight from this analysis is that a diverse system (even if it is only 90 percent effective), 
will provide significantly more benefit than third or fourth set of identical channels  
Figure 3.4-2 provides a qualitative example showing how common cause effects might affect the 
estimates of system failure probability. The probability of failure for a single string system with a 
failure rate of 20 failures per million hours over a 5000-hour mission is set at a reference of one.   
If a second string is added, the failure rate is reduced by a factor of 10, reliability improved by a 
factor of 10, red bar. Considering common cause, the improvement would be limited to five, blue 
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bar. For a third string, the reliability improvement would be a factor of 100 considering just 
random failures and limited to 9 when considering common cause.  For the example shown in 
Figure 3.6-2, additional redundancy beyond three strings has a limited value when considering 
common cause effects.  Considering just random failures, reliability improvements continue with 
additional redundancy.
Figure 3.4-2 Effects of Redundancy and Dependent Failures on Reliability 
3.4.2 Maturity Modeling 
Understanding reliability growth is essential to account for the infant mortality and infant 
mortality problems with systems.  The high cost of space flight makes it difficult to achieve the 
reliability typically predicted by component-based models. This effect must be taken into 
account since missions will often occur before maturity is achieved in essential systems.  Recent 
studies such as ESAS27 evaluate the transition from initial system tests to operation of a mature 
system.  These studies take into account the maturity and complexity of systems and attempt to 
model the transition of the risk from design and manufacturing problems occurring early in the 
program to steady state or plateau reliability reached after these problems are sorted out.  Figure 
3.4-3 shows analytical estimates of reliability of US Launch Vehicles improving over time based 
on flight experience.28
27 NASA’s Exploration Systems Architectural Study, Final Report, TM-2005-214062 November 2005, Chapter 
Section 8.5 Architecture Model. 
28 Space Launch Vehicle Reliability, I-Shih Chang, Aerospace Crosslink, Winter 2001. 
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Figure 3.4-3 Demonstrated Launch Vehicle Reliability Improvement with Maturity 
Space Launch Vehicle Reliability, I-Shih Chang, Aerospace Crosslink, Winter 2001 
3.4.3 Heritage Data 
It is important for reliability analysis to be compared to historical data (demonstrated reliability) 
for similar systems. This comparison can help calibrate the analysis and provides additional 
confidence that the analysis is not too optimistic.  It is good for the demonstrated reliability 
analysis to describe the individual failure events that go into the calculation.  The analysis should 
understand the relevance of the failure to the system and provide rationale for and discounts used 
to reduce the impact of the events.  This analysis should also account for the potential sparseness 
of the data set by including an estimate of the uncertainty associated with the estimates. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
128 of 133
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
Acronyms 
CAIB  Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CIL  Critical Items List 
COTS  Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
CRM  Continuous Risk Management 
DDT&E Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
DoD  Department of Defense 
EEE  Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical 
EPR  Engineering Peer Review 
ESAS  Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
ESD  Event Sequence Diagram 
FMEA  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FOM  Figure of Merit 
GSE  Ground Support Equipment 
HA  Hazard Analysis 
ICD  Interface Control Document 
ISS  International Space Station 
JSC  Johnson Space Station 
MCM  Multi Chip Modules 
MRB  Material Review Board 
MSFC  Marshall Space Flight Center 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
PBS  Product Breakdown Structure 
PHA  Process Hazards Analysis 
PLOA  Probability of Loss of Aircraft 
PRA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
RFA  Request for Action 
RID  Review Item Discrepancy 
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance 
SE  Systems Engineering  
SEO  Systems Engineering Office 
SFA  Space Flight Awareness 
SPRT  Super Problem Resolution Team 
SSP  Space Station Program 
STS  Space Transportation System 
TRL  Technology Readiness Level 
WBS  Work Breakdown Structure 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
129 of 133
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
Appendix A. NESC Request Form 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
130 of 133
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
131 of 133
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
132 of 133
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-108
Version:
1.0
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for  
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Page #: 
133 of 133
NESC Request Number: 05-173-E 
 Appendix B. Team List 
Name Position/Role Center/Affiliation 
Mr. Jay Leggett Team Lead JSC 
Mrs. Julie Kramer White Team Lead (Former) JSC 
Mr. James Miller Deputy Team Lead LaRC 
Dr. Bernard Adelstein Human Factors ARC 
Mr. Michael Aguilar Software GSFC 
Mr. Michael Bay SE/Avionics Lead Bay Engineering 
Dr. Michael Cleary SE Draper Laboratory 
Mr. Mitchell Davis Electronics Lead GSFC 
Mr. Cornelius Dennehy GN&C Lead GSFC 
Mr. Gerald Gilmore SE Draper Laboratory 
Mr. George Hopson Propulsion Lead MSFC 
Mr. John McManamen Mechanisms Lead JSC 
Dr. Bob Piascik Materials Lead LaRC 
Dr. Dorothy Poppe SE Draper Laboratory 
Dr. Ivatury Raju Structures Lead LaRC 
Mr. Hank Rotter Life Support and Active Thermal Lead JSC
Mr. Allan Cohen SE/History The Aerospace Corp. 
Mr. Blake Putney SE/Reliability Valador 
Mr. Robert Ryan SE MSFC 
Mr. Luke Schutzenhofer SE MSFC 
Mr. James Blair SE MSFC 
Support
Ms. Kim Cannon Program Analyst LaRC 
Ms. Christina Cooper Project Coordinator Swales Aerospace, LaRC 
Mrs. Stacey Walker/ Ms. 
Christina Cooper Technical Writers Swales Aerospace, LaRC 
Independent Reviewers and Contributors 
Mr. TK Mattingly Independent Reviewer and Contributor
Systems Planning and 
Analysis
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing
data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or 
any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate
for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently
valid OMB control number. 
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b. GRANT NUMBER 
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 
5e. TASK NUMBER 
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSORING/MONITORING
REPORT NUMBER 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
18. NUMBER 
OF
PAGES
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
01-04-2008 Technical Memorandum Oct 2005- Dec 2006
Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems
510505.01.07.01.06
Miller, James; Leggett, Jay; Kramer-White, Julie
NASA Engineering and Safety Center
Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-2199
L-19450  NESC-RP-06-108/05-173-E
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
NASA
NASA/TM-2008-215126/Vol I
Unclassified - Unlimited Availability: NASA CASI (301) 621-0390
Subject Category 05 Aircraft Design, Testing And Performance
A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and
reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team
also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated
systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception
to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations
and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy.
NESC, Cascade Failures, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis( FMEA), Highly accelerated life testing (HALT), Interface Control 
Documents (ICD), Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA), Space Transportation System (STS), PDR, Hazard Analysis (HA)
Sparing/Logistics Models
UU UU UU UU 138
STI Help Desk (email: help@sti.nasa.gov)
(301) 621-0390
